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BANKRUPTCY AND MORTGAGE LENDING:
THE HOMEOWNER DILEMMA
A. MECHELE DICKERSON*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Homeownership: perhaps the symbol of the good life in
America, undeniably the key to achieving the "American Dream,"
and a large component of household wealth. While houses most
commonly serve as shelter, they also serve as a forced savings
device. Homeowners can, however, "withdraw" their savings and
use the cash they built up in their homes if they need money to
help them survive a financial crisis. Because financial crises often
harm homeowners' credit histories, they often find that they must
borrow against the equity in their homes in the higher rate (and
fee) subprime mortgage market.
That borrowers with blemished credit must pay higher rates
and fees when they seek credit is reasonable, given the higher
risks generally posed by this type of lending. Because, however,
most subprime loans are home equity or refinance loans that
decrease homeowner wealth while increasing their debts, and
refinance loan proceeds increasingly are used to pay off credit card
debts or to pay for non-housing goods and services, refinance
borrowers essentially are putting their homes at risk to pay for the
things inside their homes or in their driveways. The refinance
market is, sadly, turning the American Dream into a nightmare
for many cash-strapped households.
This Article argues that refinance loans presumptively should
be treated differently than purchase money loans in bankruptcy.
Part I of the Article discusses the American Dream of
homeownership and chronicles recent efforts to increase
homeownership rates, especially among minority and lower
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income households. This Part then generally describes prime and
subprime purchase money and home equity lending and notes the
dramatic increase in subprime home equity lending. Part II
explores how the American Dream has turned into the American
Nightmare because of predatory practices involving some
subprime lenders. This Part begins by discussing the types of loan
products and lending practices that most often are characterized
as predatory or abusive, and then describes legislative responses
to predatory lending. This Part concludes by presenting lenders'
objections to those consumer protection laws and their alternative
proposals to curb predatory lending practices.
Part III contrasts the treatment of mortgage debt with other
types of non-purchase money consumer debt in bankruptcy cases.
Mortgage debt is favorably treated in bankruptcy cases because
the Code (like other state and federal laws) encourages
homeownership. To protect lenders who enable borrowers to buy
homes, the Code requires mortgage debt to be paid before other
claims and protects the mortgage holder's lien during the
bankruptcy case. In contrast, unsecured consumer claims are
dischargeable, absent allegations of fraud, and some non-purchase
money secured claims can be avoided in bankruptcy and be treated
instead like a general unsecured claim.
Part IV concludes by suggesting that refinance and home
equity loans are functionally equivalent to non-purchase money,
non-mortgage consumer finance loans since these loans do not help
borrowers increase their wealth. Given this, all refinance and
home equity loans should be treated as general unsecured debt in
bankruptcy unless they are used for housing purposes or reduce
the borrower's overall housing debt. In addition, the home equity
or refinance lender should have its lien stripped in bankruptcy and
be viewed as a creditor holding an unsecured claim.
II. THE AMERICAN DREA.l\1:: HOMEOWNERSHIP
A. Benefits and Beneficiaries of the Dream

Research indicates that homeowners feel better about
themselves, maintain better and safer neighborhoods, and live in
neighborhoods that have better schools.! In addition to these
1. See Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on
Metropolitan Society, 80 MINN. L. REV. 825, 857 (1996) (hereinafter Orfield,
Metropolitan School Desegregation] ("A good home in a good neighborhood and

higher education are the primary dreams of American families ....");GEORGE
S. MASNICK, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV.,
HOMEOWNERSHIP TRENDS AND RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES IN
THE 20TH CENTURY 9 (2001) (discussing studies); J. MICHAEL COLLINS ET AL.,
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., TOWARDS A TARGETED
HOMEOWNERSHIP TAX CREDIT 3·4 (1998) (discussing studies).

2004]

Bankruptcy and Mortgage Lending: The Homeowner Dilemma

21

psychological and societal benefits, homeownership almost always
is financially beneficial. Home equity is a significant component of
household wealth and, for most lower-income and minority
families, is the primary component of their net worth. 2 Moreover,
owning a home can be a mitigating factor when a homeowner
suffers economic misfortunes because owners can borrow against
their home equity to pay living expenses (if their income declines
or they incur unexpected expenses) or to payoff higher interest
existing debt.s While 68% of total households participated in the
American Dream of homeownership in 2002, 4 there is
unfortunately a stubborn racial and economic disparity in
homeownership rates.
Due to concerted efforts by the federal government to bolster
low income and minority homeownership rates,s minorities
constituted more than 40% of the net growth in homeownership
2. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., STATE OF THE
NATION'S HOUSING 2003, at 6-7 [hereinafter STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING
2003]; TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS AMERICANS IN
DEBT 233-34 (1999). See also Subprime Lending: Defining the Market and Its
Consumers: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer
Credit and the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, Before the House
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 3 (2004) (prepared statement of Anthony
M. Yezer) (stating that medium income households owning homes hold 0% of
their wealth in common stocks and "virtually all" in home equity and
government-guaranteed assets); John Karl Scholz & Kara Levine, U.S. Black·
White Wealth Inequality: A Survey at 42 (2002) (noting that homes constitute
a larger portion of minority household wealth), available at
http://www.russellsage.org/programs/proj_reviews/silrevscholzlevine01.pdf.
3. Owners who need to radically reduce living expenses can always sell the
home, use the equity to reduce existing debts, then rent less expensive
housing. White homeowners are more secure financially than white renters
and are less likely to file for bankruptcy than white renters. Elizabeth
Warren, The Economics of Race: When Making It to the Middle Is Not Enough,
61 WASH. & LEE LAW REV. (forthcoming Feb. 2005) (manuscript at 17, on file
with author). In contrast, blacks appear to increase their risk of filing for
bankruptcy by being a homeowner because unlike white homeowners, black
homeowners are more likely to file for bankruptcy than black renters. Id.
4. STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2003, supra note 2, at 15.
5. Raisa Bahchieva, Susan Wachter & Elizabeth Warren, Mortgage Debt,
Bankruptcy and the Sustainability of Homeownership, Credit Markets for the
Poor 11 (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing
incentives the government provides to lenders to encourage them to loan to
lower- and middle·income households). For example, Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac, and the FHA all adopted initiatives designed to increase homeownership
generally and minority homeownership specifically. These initiatives included
lowering down payment requirements, recognizing multiple income sources to
qualify for a housing loan, providing loan documentation in Spanish, and
conducting fair housing audits of lender practices to combat realtors and
lenders' racially discriminatory marketing and lending practices. MASNICK,
supra note 1, at 10. See generally Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A
Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX.
L. REV. 1255, 1276-77 (2002) (discussing federal initiatives in the 1990s to
increase lending to low and middle·income borrowers).
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during the 1990s and the growth in loans to minorities increased
at rates more than double the growth in loans to potential white
home buyers. 6 However, while homeownership rates for whites in
2002 was almost 75%, the ownership rates for blacks was 49%an increase for blacks of only 6% over the last decade. 7 The
homeownership rates for other minority groups also lag the white
homeownership rate, with Hispanics having a 4 7% rate, Asians
having a 54% rate, 8 and Native Americans having rates of
approximately 34%. 9 Indeed, while most white households have
owned their homes since the end of World War II, the majority of
black and Hispanic households still has not yet reached this
level.1°
Because 86% of high-income households own their own homes
as opposed to only 45% of lower-income households and minority
household income is lower than white household income, income
no doubt contributes to the racial homeownership gap,ll Median
white household income in 2002 ($47,000) is higher than the
median household income for all races ($43,000), is higher than
median Hispanic household income ($34,000), and is significantly
higher than median black household income ($30,000).1 2 In
addition, blacks are almost twice as likely to be lower-income
(51%) than whites (28%), and twice the number of white workers
(32%) earn over $75,000 annually as black workers (16%).1 3
6. See JOSEPHINE LOUIE ET AL., JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF
HARVARD UNIV., THE HOUSING NEEDS OF LOWER-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 16
(1998) (reporting that minority home buyers contributed 42% of the growth in
homeowners between 1994 and 1997 but were only 15% of all homeowners
before that growth); MARK DUDA & ERIC S. BELSKY, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS.
STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE ANATOMY OF THE LOW-INCOME
HOMEOWNERSHIP BOOM IN THE 1990S 1 (2001) (noting that minorities
constituted 19.1% of first-time buyers in 1993 but 30% in 1999); ld. at 2
(reporting that growth in loans to white home buyers was 42% in contrast to
98% growth rate in loans to black buyers and 125% growth rate to Hispanic
buyers); STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2003, supra note 2, at 15 (reporting
that minorities constituted 32% of first-time buyers in 2001).
7. STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2003, supra note 2, at 105 tbl.A-5.
8. ld.
9. FANNIE MAE, AMERICAN DREAM COMMITMENT 2002 REPORT 10 (2003),
available at http://www .fanniemae.com/initiatives/pdf/adc/full2002. pdf. See
also Press Release, National American Indian Housing Council, Native
American Homeownership: Far Below Other Americans; But Mortgage
Default Data Shown As Less Risky (Nov. 13, 2002), available at
http://naihc.indian.com/pr/mortgage-da ta -11-02 .h tml.
10. See Menna Demessie, National Urban League Reports Racial
Disparities
Continue,
at
http://www.civilrights.org/issueslhousing
/details.cfm?id=9727 (July 30, 2002).
11. COLLINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
12. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, PUB. NO. P60-221, INCOME IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2002, at 3 (2003).
13. Id.
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Whether the racial homeownership gap is created by income
disparities, the lingering effects of earlier discriminatory housing
policies, or other factors, it has not been closed despite recent
efforts. 14 Indeed, even though the number of mortgage loans to
low-income buyers in the 1990s grew by almost double the rate of
loans to high-income buyers,l5 the racial home ownership gap has
remained constant since the 1980s.l6 In fact, one study projected
that, at the current rate, white-black homeownership rates would
not achieve parity until the yea~ 3666.17

B. Striving for and Struggling with the Dream
People who want to purchase a home enter the mortgage
market by taking out a purchase money loan (commonly referred
to as a first mortgage) to buy their home. Existing homeowners
who need additional cash and want to borrow against their home
can take out a home equity loan (commonly referred to as a second
mortgage) or a home equity credit line. Though home equity loans
often are marketed as relatively inexpensive ways to borrow
money for home repairs or improvements, borrowers can (and
often do) borrow the entire amount of the equity in their homes
(i.e., cash out) and use the proceeds to pay for non-housing services
or products, or to repay consumer debt (often unsecured credit
card debt).1 8 It also has become a common practice for "second"
mortgages to pay off the first mortgage and wrap the principal
amount, fees, and costs associated with that loan into the new loan
14. For a discussion of the factors that contribute to the racial
homeownership gap, see A. Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy,
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming Feb. 2005). See also Keith N. Hylton &
Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination: Economic Theory, Econometric
Evidence, and the Community Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO. L.J. 237, 250-51,
268-75 (1986) (discussing the extent of racial discrimination in mortgage
lending practices).
15. DUDA & BELSKY, supra note 6, at 1 (reporting that loans to high-income
buyers grew by 52% while loans to low-income home buyers grew by 94%).
16. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL CENSUS OF HOUSING
TABLES OWNERSHIP RATES (2002), at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/
housing/census/historic/ownrate.html (last updated July 8, 2004). See also
MASNICK, supra note 1, at 2; JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL AND ECON. STUDIES,
HOMEOWNERSHIP: PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDERS WHO OWN THEIR OWN
HOMES: 1983-1997, available at http://www.jointcenter.org/DB/printer/
homeown.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2004); STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING
2003, supra note 2, at 16.
17. STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2003, supra note 2, at 14. See also
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 231 (indicating that minorities show "no
sign of making up the [homeownership] gap").
18. Subprime Lending: Defining the Market and Its Customers: Joint

Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit and the
Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, Before the House Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 108th Cong. 7 (2004) [hereinafter Stein Statement] (prepared
statement of Eric Stein).
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thus giving the new lender first-lien status.l 9 When interest rates
fall, homeowners often seek to refinance their mortgage loans to
obtain a loan with a lower interest rate. In contrast to cash out
refinance loans (which give borrowers cash, but increase their
overall mortgage debt), refinance loans that have lower interest
rates than the existing mortgage (or that allow borrowers to
change from or to a fixed or adjustable interest rate) are designed
to reduce homeowners' monthly payments and total overall debt.
Purchase money and home equity loans can be prime or
subprime.2o Prime (or conventional rate) loans are made to
borrowers with solid, essentially unblemished credit who meet the
lender's underwriting standards and are viewed as less risky and
more deserving of the lowest available rates.
In contrast,
subprime lending generally is defined as lending that involves an
elevated credit risk. 21 Riskier homeowners (including those who
are self-employed, have difficulty verifying their income, lack the
funds to make the required down payment, have impaired or
limited credit histories, or have relatively higher debt to income
ratios) must pay higher rates and fees in the subprime loan
market to compensate lenders for the increased risk of default. 22
19. Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime "HEL" Was Paved with
Good Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home
Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473, 524 (2000). Lenders likely demand first
lien status to take advantage of the protections given those liens under federal
law. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) [hereinafter DIDMCA]
(preempting state usury laws that regulate the interest rate that can be
charged for loans secured by a first lien on residential property).
20. Subprime loans also are characterized as "non-prime" by members of
the subprime industry.
21. Federal Reserve Governor Edward M. Gramlich, Subprime Mortgage
Lending: Benefits, Costs, and Challenges (2004) (memorializing the Governor's
remarks at the Financial Services Roundtable Annual Housing Policy Meeting
on May 21, 2004), available at http:www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches/2004/200405211 (last updated May 21, 2004).
22. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 28 (2000) (hereinafter
TREASURY/HUD REPORT] (noting that borrowers who present less risk are
offered lower interest rates), available at http://www.huduser.org/
publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf; Engel & McCoy, supra note 5, at 1265-66
(discussing increased costs associated with subprime lending). Lenders charge
different rates, points, and fees for subprime loans and typically do not
publicly disclose pricing information. Because of this, it is difficult to predict
with precision when a borrower will be deemed ineligible for a conventional
loan or which terms a subprime lender will include in the subprime product.
See Mansfield, supra note 19, at 533-35. See generally TREASURY/HUD
REPORT, supra, at 27-28 (listing factors lenders consider when determining
whether borrower is eligible for prime rates); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE SYS., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, & OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, INTERAGENCY GUIDELINES ON
SUBPRIME LENDING (1999) (discussing guidelines federal banking regulators
use to define subprime portfolio).
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Subprime borrowers, like debtors in bankruptcy, also are more
likely: to have had a household member suffer a major illness; to
have large medical expenses, to have income interruptions caused
by unemployment; to be recently divorced; and to borrow more
heavily against their houses than mortgage borrowers overall.23
Finally, most subprime loans (whether offered by traditional
lenders or finance companies)24 are non-purchase money refinance
loans 25 and most home equity loans, home equity lines of credit,
and refinance loans are used to purchase or pay for non-housing
consumer goods or services. 26
23. Subprime Lending: Defining the Market and Its Consumers: Joint
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit and the
Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, Before the House Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 108th Cong. 8 (2004) [hereinafter Staten Statement] (prepared
statement of Michael E. Staten, Credit Research Center); ELIZABETH WARREN
& AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS
MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 83 (2003); DEBORAH GoLDSTEIN,
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., UNDERSTANDING
PREDATORY LENDING: MOVING TOWARDS A COMMON DEFINITION AND
WORKABLE SOLUTIONS 31 (1999).
Recent research also indicates that
borrowers with higher loan-to-value ("LTV") ratios are more likely to lose their
homes and that debtors in bankruptcy tend to have higher LTV ratios than
non-debtors. See Bachieva, Wachter & Warren, supra note 5, at 15--17.
24. Until the early 1980s, traditional lenders offered most home-mortgage
loans, typically to customers with prime credit ratings. Finance companies
and non-bank lenders, which now dominate the subprime lending market,
wrote few loans principally because of liquidity constraints (which largely
have been removed because of the widespread securitization of mortgage
loans). See Engel & McCoy, supra note 5, at 1272, 1279 (describing changes to
home mortgage lending market). Currently, traditional lenders often avoid
subprime lending because of the risks associated with that lending, the
likelihood that they will be required to foreclose on property, and because of
their concern that loan rejection rates that appear to correlate with race will
subject them to discrimination law suits. Id. See also State of the Banking
Industry: Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
108th Cong. 4 (2004) (statement of James E. Gilleran, Director, Office of Thrift
Supervision) (commenting that subprime lending is not fully served by
conventional lenders); Serv. Corp. of Retired Executives, Borrowing Money, at
http://www.scoreknox.org/librarylborrowing.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
25. See Subprime Lending: Defining the Market and Its Customers: Joint
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit and the
Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, Before the House Comm. on Fin.
Serus., 108th Cong. 9, 10 (2004) [hereinafter CFAL Statement] (prepared
statement of the Coalition for Fair and Affordable Lending ("CFAL") and New
Century Financial Corporation); Harold L. Bunce et al., Subprime
Foreclosures: The Smoking Gun of Predatory Lending?, in HOUSING POLICY IN
THE NEW MILLENIUM 257, 260 n.4 (2003) (suggesting that 80% of subprime
loans are refinance loans); Stein Statement, supra note 18, at 7.
26. See, e.g., Marianne A. Hilgert & Jeanne M. Hogarth, Household
Financial Management: The Connection Between Knowledge and Behavior, 89
FED. RES. BULL. No. 7 309, 310 (July 2003) (indicating that only 35% of
respondents in the survey reported refinancing a mortgage or loan for home
improvement); Stein Statement, supra note 18, at 7 (citing research that
indicates that most subprime loans are refinance loans used to pay for non-
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The refinance market, especially subprime refinance loans,
has grown tremendously over the last decade.2 7 For example,
while the total mortgage volume (including purchase and
refinance loans) in 1990 was $458 billion, the volume for refinance
loans in 2003 was $2.2 trillion.2s In addition, the number of
subprime mortgage originations in 1994 was $35 billion but
increased to $160 billion in 1999, $213 billion in 2002, and $325
billion in 2003. 29 Similarly, subprime originations doubled their
share of the overall mortgage origination market from 5% in 1994
to 10.5% in 2003. 30 Moreover, the overall number of subprime
loans increased from approximately 100,000 in 1993, to over 1.36
million less than ten years later, in 2002.31
Home equity lending generally, and subprime lending in
particular, increased in volume and became much more popular
for a number of reasons. First, due to technological changes, it
became easier for lenders to assess, or "score", a borrower's credit
history. 32 In addition, most mortgage loans, and virtually all
subprime loans, are now securitized or sold in the secondary
market to private investors.33 Indeed, the subprime securitization
market increased by over $70 billion from 1994 to 1999 and this
increase appears to have contributed to the increase in subprime
originations. 34
housing debt).
27. See Press Release, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Subprime Lending Report, Unequal Burden: Income and Racial
Disparities in Subprime Lending in America (Apr. 12, 2000) [hereinafter
Unequal Burden] (reporting that the number of subprime refinance loans
increased
ten-fold
between
1993
and
1998),
available
at
http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelf18/pressrel/subprime.html.
28. Holden
Lewis,
Reasons
Remain
to
Refinance,
at
http://www. bankrate.com/brm/news/refinance/20040 115a 1.asp?prodtype=m tg
&thisponsor=refi (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
29. ROBERTO G. QUERCIA ET AL., UNIV. OF N. CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL,
THE IMPACT OF NORTH CAROLINA'S ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING LAW: A
DESCRIPTIVE ASSESSMENT 2 (2003); CFAL Statement, supra note 25, at 3;
Bunce et al., supra note 25, at 257.
30. CFAL Statement, supra note 25, at 3; Bunce et al., supra note 25, at
257.
31. ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS FOR REFORM NOW
("ACORN''), SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2004: PREDATORY LENDING IN AMERICA
6 (2004), [hereinafter ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2004], available at
http://www.acorn.org/index.php?id=108.
32. See Dennis Hevesi, A Wider Loan Pool Draws More Sharks, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 2002, § 11, at 1 (discussing increased use of computerized credit
scoring); The Condition of the Banking Industry: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 4 (2004) (statement
of Donald E. Powell, Chairman, FDIC) (suggesting that household
indebtedness increased because of market and technological changes).
33. See Mansfield, supra note 19, at 531-32 (describing increase use of
securitization of subprime loans).
34. See generally Subprime Lending: Defining the Market and Its
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Changes in federal tax laws also helped fuel the growth in
non-purchase money lending.
Owners who itemize their
deductions on their federal income tax forms now have an
incentive to borrow against their homes because the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 (''TRA") eliminated the deduction of interest for all
consumer debt except home equity loans. 35
This change
encouraged itemizers to borrow against their homes to pay off
existing debt or to pay for non-housing goods and services rather
than incur additional (or continue to maintain existing) unsecured
credit card debt. In addition, increased government directives that
lenders provide more loans to lower-income households
encouraged home equity lenders to aggressively advertise and
promote home equity and refinance loans, initially to prime
borrowers (as second mortgages) and ultimately to subprime
borrowers. 36
Efforts to increase homeownership rates among lower-income
and minority households caused many lenders to drop the required
average down payment for first-time home buyers from 10% to 35% and some even offer mortgages with zero-down. 37 Lenders also
Consumers: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer
Credit and the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, Before the House
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 3 (2004) [hereinafter Samuels Statement]
(prepared statement of Sandy Samuels, Senior Managing Director and Chief
Legal Officer, Countrywide Financial Corporation-one of the nation's largest ·
home mortgages lenders-and on behalf of the Housing Policy Council of the
Financial Services Roundtable) (discussing practice of selling or securitizing
loans in its portfolio to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and other secondary
purchasers). QUERCIA ET AL., supra note 29, at 2 (discussing an increase in
the subprime securitization market from $11 billion to $83 billion). Most
originating lenders sell their loans to secondary purchasers (including private
investors and private investors like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and, Ginnie
Mac) then use the sale proceeds to originate more loans. The secondary
purchasers either hold the loans or pool them into mortgage-backed securities
which they then sell to other (typically large institutional) investors. See
Engel & McCoy, supra note 5, at 1273-74 (describing securitization and the
effect it had on subprime lending); Subprime Lending: Defining the Market

and Its Consumers: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and
Consumer Credit and the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, Before
the House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 4 (2004) [hereinafter Bryce
Statement] (prepared statement of Teresa A. Bryce).
35. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99·514, § 511(b), 100 Stat. 2245,
2246-49. Congress capped the amount of the home equity interest deduction
at $100,000 in 1987. Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100·203, § 10102, 101
Stat. 1330-84 to 1330-87 (codified at I.R.C. 163(h)(3) (1993)).
36. See generally Mansfield, supra note 19, at 522-25 (discussing likely
causes for the increase in consumer home equity borrowing).
37. Ruth Simon & Michelle Higgins, Stretched Buyers Push Mortgage
Levels to a New High, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2002, at D1; STUART S.
ROSENTHAL, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., ELIMINATING
CREDIT BARRIERS TO INCREASE HOMEOWNERSHIP: HOW FAR CAN WE GO? 1, 7
(2001); Farnoosh Torabi, Home Loans First·Timers, MONEY, Nov. 2003, at 35
(discussing Fannie Mae's Flex mortgage and Wells Fargo's No Money Down
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made it easier for cash-strapped buyers to purchase homes that
would have been beyond their reach fifteen years earlier by
encouraging them to apply for both first and second mortgages
when they purchased the home. 38 Though lower- and middleincome potential and existing homeowners may have greater
access to credit due to this democratization of credit, many of those
homeowners are paying far too much for their housing expenses.
That is, decreasing barriers to homeownership has now increased
the number of homeowners (especially low-income homeowners)
who spend 50% of their monthly income on housing expenses - a
significant increase from the 30% figure historically recommended
by private and public lenders. 39
Research indicates that 80% of extremely low income
homeowners 40 spend more than 30% of their income on housing
expenses (mortgage, property taxes, and insurance) and that 60%
of these homeowners spend more than half their income on
housing expenses. 41 Given the increase in job instability, 4 2 the
decreased availability of comprehensive health insurance, 43 and
Plus 3% or no-money-down loan programs).
38. Doing so allowed them to avoid paying the private mortgage insurance
typically charged when borrowers put down less than 20% of the home price.
Simon & Higgins, supra note 37.
See Exec. Order No. 418 Housing
Certification, Commonwealth of Mass., Dep't of Hous. and Comm. Dev. (2003)
(discussing "soft second mortgages" which allow the borrower to avoid paying
private
mortgage
insurance),
available
at
www2.massdhcd.com/
e418portal!FY03/CommReport02.asp?MN0=163&FY=2003.
39. LOUIE ET AL., supra note 6, at 3; STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2003,
supra note 2, at 3, 4. See also Judy Ellen & Feldman McGirt, Am I Ready to
Buy a Home?, MONEY, Mar. 2004, at 30 (suggesting that lenders prefer that
housing expenses-mortgage, insurance, taxes and maintenance--not exceed
28% of gross income and that total debt payments not exceed 36%). While the
mortgage debt burden has declined for high-income homeowners, the
proportion of total family income low-income homeowners devote to paying
their mortgage debt increased. See Bahchieva, Wachter & Warren, supra note
5, at 11.
40. LOUIE ET AL., supra note 6, at 4 (defining extremely low income
homeowners as homeowners with incomes less than 30 % of area median).
41. Id. at 3. A household that pays between 30% and 50% of income for
housing (including mortgage, insurance, real estate taxes and utilities) is
moderately cost-burdened while a household that pays more than half its
income for housing is severely cost-burdened. See STATE OF THE NATION'S
HOUSING 2003, supra note 2, at 25-26 (suggesting that 30% of all U.S.
households have housing affordability problems, that 1 in 7 spend more than
half their income on housing, and that homeowners now outnumber renters).
The total number of Asian, Black, and Hispanic lower-income households who
are severely cost-burdened is more than twice the number of households who
either are moderately burdened or not burdened (pay 30% or less of monthly
income for housing). See id. at 105 tbl.A-9.
42. WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 23, at 83 (documenting the increased
likelihood that an earner will lose a job).
43. Increasingly, employers are providing reduced (or no) health insurance
even though medical care expenses have soared. See JOEL E. MILLER, NAT'L
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increased rates of divorce, 44 lower-income households increasingly
are unable to pay for basic home maintenance or more extensive
renovations. 45 Because these homeowners can barely pay their
mortgage debt, they face the prospect of either remaining in a
deteriorating home or going even deeper in debt by taking out a
home equity loan to make any needed repairs to their home. 4 6
Little data address the extent to which the increased
availability of credit has helped borrowers buy and retain their
homes. Some studies suggest that there has been a dramatic
growth in the number of foreclosures by subprime lenders
(especially relative to the number of foreclosures by other lenders),
that the foreclosure rate for subprime mortgages is thirteen times
higher than the rate for prime loans, and that subprime lenders
tend to foreclose on loans at a much quicker rate than prime or
conventional loans. 4 7 That lenders foreclose on sub prime loans
soon after they are originated suggests the unaffordability of those
loans when they were originated. 4B

COALITION ON HEALTH CARE, A PERFECT STORM: THE CONFLUENCE OF
FORCES AFFECTING HEALTH CARE COVERAGE 9 (2001), available at
http://www.nchc.org/materials/studies/index.shtml; Stephanie Strom, For
Middle Class, Health Insurance Becomes a Luxury, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2003,
§ 1, at 33 (noting the increase in the number of American workers who lack
health insurance due to "ever soaring costs and job losses").
44. Roughly 50% of all marriages will end in divorce and a recent book
suggests that middle-class couples have a higher divorce rate than other
groups. WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 23, at 85-86.
45. LOUIE ET AL., supra note 6, at 3.
46. Id. Homeowners who lack funds to make home repairs place their
health at risk by continuing to live in homes with lead paint, mold, or broken
(or hazardous) cooling or heating systems. Id. at 12-16, 22. Though the
federal government made concerted efforts in the 1990s to increase
homeownership rates for minority and lower-income households, it has never
provided funds or tax subsidies to help these owners pay for home repairs or
improvements. These households must rely either on private charitable
organizations (to make the repairs) or private lenders (to loan funds to pay for
their repairs). Id. at 11.
47. See Bunce et al., supra note 25, at 263-64. See generally ACORN,
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2004, supra note 31, at 9; Dan Immergluck & Geoff
Smith, Risky Business - An Econometric Analysis of the Relationship Between
Subprime Lending and Neighborhood Foreclosures (2004), available at
http://woodstockinst.org/document/riskybusinesspr.pdf.
48. The quick foreclosure rate in the subprime market also suggests that, at
least for some subprime lenders, their ultimate goal was to strip borrowers of
their home equity, foreclose on their homes, and sell the homes for a profit- a
practice often referred to as a "loan to own" policy. See Illinois Association of
Mortgage Brokers Backs Important Consumer Protection Legislation, PR
NEWSWIRE, Apr. 17, 2000 [hereinafter Illinois Association of Mortgage
Brokers] (discussing bipartisan attack on "loan to own" practice), at
http://www. prnewswire.com.

0

The John Marshall Law Review

30

III.

[38:19

THE AMERICAN NIGHTMARE: PREDATORY LENDING

A. Nature of the Abuse

The increase in home equity lending has, not surprisingly,
lead to an increase in the incidence of abusive practices in the
subprime home equity lending market. Though not all subprime
loans are predatory, there is growing evidence of abusive practices
in the subprime loan market. 49 While there is no generally agreed
upon definition of "predatory," most agree that predatory lending
generally describes fraudulent practices involving loan
originations and also loans with terms and practices that use
inappropriate risk-based pricing.5° Fraudulent or illegal predatory
practices (all of which are illegal under existing laws) include
forging loan documents, misrepresenting the borrower's income,
backdating documents, failing to disclose information required by
federal or state laws, and inducing borrowers to apply for loans to
pay for home improvements which either are never done or are
improperly done. 51 Non-fraudulent predatory loans vary in type,
but tend to share certain characteristics.
Predatory loans often have interest rates (including default
interest rates) that are significantly higher than needed to ensure
against the risk of borrower default. 52 Moreover, some lenders
49. Subprime mortgage lenders and loan servicers recently have reached
multi-million dollar settlements based on unscrupulous or illegal practices
involving subprime loans. See Michael Hudson, Banking on Misery, S.
EXPOSURE, Summer 2003, at 29 (discussing litigation and settlements
involving subprime lenders including CitiFinancial and Associates); Daniela
Deane, Mortgage Servicer Must Pay Borrowers,- Fairbanks Accused of
Unscrupulous Practices, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2003, at E1 (discussing a $40
million settlement with Fairbanks Capital Corp., the nation's largest servicer
of subprime mortgages); Timothy L. O'Brien, Fed Assesses Citigroup Unit $70
Million in Loan Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2004, at C1 (announcing penalty
against Citigroup and its consumer finance company subsidiary). Because
most predatory loans are subprime loans, prime loans rarely are deemed to be
predatory and predatory lending almost always occurs in the subprime
market. See TREASURY/HUD REPORT, supra note 22, at 2, 24-5; JOSEPH A.
SMITH, JR., N.C. COMM'R OF BANKS, NORTH CAROLINA'S PREDATORY LENDING
LAW: ITS ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION 1 (2002).
50. See generally ACORN, Predatory Lending Practices (discussing
practices
viewed
as
being
predatory),
at
http://www.acorn.org/
index.php?id=754 (last visited Sept. 17, 2004).
51. See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 23, at 11-12; ACORN, Predatory
Lending Practices, supra note 50 (discussing home improvement scams).
Another home improvement scam, known as property flipping, causes
potential buyers to purchase a home that has serious (but masked) defects and
an intentionally inflated appraisal. The scam involves the seller of the home
with the hidden defects, an appraiser, and the subprime lender or broker. See
ACORN, Predatory Lending Practices, supra note 50 (discussing property
flipping); Hevesi, supra note 32, at 1 (discussing predatory lending practices
among the poor).
52. See Hevesi, supra note 32, at 1 (characterizing default interest rates as
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finance excessive fees (including single-premium credit life
insurance 53) into the loans and many borrowers appear to either
be unaware that these fees have been added to the loan or they
learn about these fees at closing.5 4 Loans that have mandatory
arbitration clauses55 or balloon payments,56 as well as negatively
a "nail in the coffin" because borrowers who already have defaulted on loan
payments will not be able to make higher payments caused by the higher
default interest rate). Though disputed by the subprime market, some
researchers have concluded that the interest rates of subprime loans are often
higher than necessary to protect lenders from the higher costs associated with
lending to riskier borrowers. See Bunce et al., supra note 25, at 258. But see
Staten Statement, supra note 23, at 5 (arguing that risks justify higher rates);
Bryce Statement, supra note 34, at 6 (discussing elevated operational costs
associated with subprime lending).
53. Credit life insurance is designed to pay off a debt if the borrower dies
before paying the loan. Single-premium credit life insurance requires the
borrower to pay for the insurance in one lump sum (instead of over time) and
typically is financed into subprime loans, thereby increasing the loan amount.
This type of fee is especially pernicious since borrowers often pay for the
insurance over the life of the loan (since it is included in the loan balance)
even though the policy itself typically last no more than five years. ACORN,
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002: PREDATORY LENDING IN AMERICA 42
[hereinafter ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002], at http://www.acorn.org/
index.php?id=108.
54. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 23, at 14, 31 (discussing manipulative
pressure tactics designed to exploit borrowers' cognitive biases and convince
them to sign documents at closing that contain terms different from those
initially presented to the borrower); Jean Braucher, Defining Unfairness:
Empathy and Economic Analysis at the Federal Trade Commission, 68 B.U. L.
REV. 349, 366 (1998) (discussing behavioral tendencies that cause consumer to
accept terms presented in form contract). See generally Ctr. For Responsible
Lending, Abusive Practices: 7 Signs of Predatory Lending (discussing study
that suggests high numbers of borrowers are unaware that their loan financed
single premium credit insurance), at http://www.responsiblelending.org/
abuses/abusive.cfm (last visited May 28, 2004).
Credit insurance can
especially be profitable to lenders who are associated with the insurance
companies that provide the insurance. See Hudson, supra note 49, at 32
(discussing cross-selling and the profitability of credit insurance to one lender
(Citigroup) because a sister company writes the insurance policy).
55. Mandating private arbitration forces borrowers to abandon certain
judicial rights, including a jury trial, appeal options, and the right to rely on
judicial precedent. Consumer advocates argue that mandatory arbitration
protects lenders from large jury verdicts that would force them to reform their
predatory practices. See Hudson, supra note 49, at 42-43. Lenders contend
that arbitration helps consumers by allowing them to avoid the excessive costs
and delays associated with the jury trial system. Predatory Mortgage
Lending: The Problem, Impact, and Responses: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 6 (2001)
[hereinafter Zeltzer Statement] (prepared statement of Jeffrey Zeltzer,
National Home Equity Mortgage Association).
56. Balloon payments require borrowers to pay off a loan balance in one
payment after making regular payments, typically for 5-7 years. A balloon
loan often requires the borrower to pay off more than 75% of the principal
balance of the loan in one payment. See generally FANNIE MAE, TAKING THE
MYSTERY
OUT
OF
YOUR
MORTGAGE
(2003),
available
at
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amortized loans, can also be abusive, depending on the borrower's
financial condition. 57
Mandatory prepayment penalties, which charge borrowers
who pay off (or refinance) loans early, also are cited as potentially
abusive. Both consumer and lender advocates agree that a loan
that fails to disclose the penalty or that contains penalties that are
"unduly long'' is abusive. 58 Consumer advocates argue that, even
if disclosed, these penalties can still strip owner wealth because
they often charge up to six months' interest if borrowers prepay
the loan in the first five years. 5 9 Consumer advocates also contend
that the prevalence of prepayment penalties in subprime loans
and their virtual absence in prime loans suggests that lenders are
unfairly targeting subprime borrowers.so
Subprime lenders
respond that prepayment penalties often help borrowers because
lenders can offer them lower interest rate loans because these
http://www.efanniemae.com/singlefamily/pdf/takingthemysteryout.pdf
Oast
visited June 14, 2004).
57. Negative amortization occurs when the borrower makes regular
monthly payments, but the principle loan balance increases because the
payments do not pay off accrued interest or principal. While both balloons and
negative amortization can be beneficial to some borrowers (especially those
who need the low payments associated with negatively amortized loans or who
intend to sell their homes before the balloon payment is due), lower·income
borrowers rarely benefit from these loans - especially if they are forced to
refinance the loan and incur additional points and fees. See generally
ACORN, Predatory Lending Practices, supra note 50 (describing negative
amortization).
58. See, e.g., CFAL Statement, supra note 25, at 18.
59. Thus, for a $100,000 loan with 11% interest, the prepayment penalty
would exceed $5,000. See Seven Signs of Predatory Lending, S. EXPOSURE,
Summer 2003, at 70. A consumer advocate notes that the $7,500 fee that
would be assessed against a homeowner who sought to prepay a $150,000 loan
(with an interest rate of 12%) constitutes approximately 40% of the total net
worth of the median black family in 2001. Stein Statement, supra note 18, at
8. Fannie Mae discourages lenders from including mandatory prepayment
penalties in the loan document unless the penalty is disclosed and gives the
borrower some benefits. Fannie Mae, FAQ: Predatory Lending Practices, at
http://fanniemae.com/faq/231001q.jhtml?p=FAQ Oast visited Oct. 10, 2004).
Two large subprime lenders (Household International and The Associates)
settled complaints about involving prepayment penalties and Household
agreed to limit all prepayment penalties to the first two years of the loan.
Paul Beckett, Household Settlement Boosts Stock, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2002,
atA7.
60. Stein Statement, supra note 18, at 8-9; U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY
AND U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. & URBAN DEY., 106TH CONG., JOINT REPORT ON
CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 90 (2000) (suggesting that
more than two·thirds of subprime loans, but only 2% of prime loans, contain
prepayment penalties); DEBBIE GOLDSTEIN & STACY STROHAUER SON, WHY
PREPAYMENT PENALTIES ARE ABUSIVE IN SUBPRIME HOME LOANS 6 (2003)
(suggesting that 80% of subprime loans versus less than 2% of prime loans
have prepayment penalties), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/
pdf!PPP_Policy_Paper2.pdf.
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loans are more valuable in the secondary market.61 Moreover,
lenders contend that they should be allowed to include reasonable
prepayment penalties in subprime loans to protect themselves
against the uncertainty and market instability associated with the
frequent turnover of loans.62
Certain lender practices are also associated with predatory
loans. One practice, known as loan flipping, involves repeated
refinances of the same loan. 63 Another practice, often referred to
as "asset-based" or in rem lending, involves loans that the
borrower cannot afford to repay. Consumer advocates argue that
lenders who engage in asset-based lending focus on the borrower's
equity in the home and have as their ultimate goal receiving the
borrower's house, not receiving timely loan payments.6 4 Because
mortgage brokers play a primary role in home loan originations
and originate significantly more subprime loans than prime loans,
flipping, in rem lending, and other unfair or fraudulent practices
often involve brokers. 65 Indeed, because broker compensation
depends largely on the total loan amount, brokers have an
incentive both to place borrowers in high interest loans and to
pack excessive fees into the loan. 66 Likewise, brokers and loan
61. See CFAL Statement, supra note 25, at 18-19 (suggesting that a
prepayment penalty can lower an interest rate by a full point and that
subprime borrowers who do not intend to move or refinance in the near future
would benefit).
Indeed, the subprime industry maintains that forcing
borrowers to bring additional cash to pay points (and, thus "buy down" the
interest rate) at closing is the functional equivalent of an upfront prepayment
penalty. Id. at 20.
62. Samuels Statement, supra note 34, at 11.
63. See, e.g., Seven Signs of Predatory Lending, supra note 59, at 71. Some
lenders (or their brokers) intentionally offer borrowers a high interest rate
loan or one with unaffordable monthly payments to ensure that the borrower
will need to refinance the loan. With each refinance, the loan amount
increases because new fees are added (and the borrower often is forced to pay
a prepayment penalty). Consumer advocates argue that these transactions
give borrowers few tangible benefits and serve only to strip equity from the
home. ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002, supra note 53, at 44. See
generally ACORN, Predatory Lending Practices, supra note 50 (suggesting
that lenders start borrowers with higher interest rate loan with goal of
flipping loan to slightly lower rate that charges additional fees).
64. See, e.g., ACORN, Predatory Lending Practices, supra note 50
(discussing the broker's goal of obtaining fees and the lender's goal of
foreclosing on the home then reselling it for a profit).
65. CFAL Statement, supra note 25, at 4; Stein Statement, supra note 18, at
10. See PR Newswire, Illinois Association of Mortgage Brokers, supra note 48
(suggesting that the majority of home loans are originated by brokers).
Though borrowers may believe (and may have been told) that the broker's job
is to help them find the most favorable loan terms, mortgage brokers are
unregulated in most states and generally owe no fiduciary duties to borrowers.
Stein Statement, supra note 18, at 10.
66. Brokers also have an incentive to flip lower rate loans into higher rate
loans or to pack fees into the loan because of the industry practice of
compensating mortgage brokers with a "yield spread premium" that pays

34

The John Marshall Law Review

(38:19

officers have an incentive to make loans with a high loan-to-value
ratio because most loans are sold or securitized in the secondary
market. Brokers/lenders have no incentive to determine the
borrower's creditworthiness or ability to repay the loan because
their compensation is not based on whether the loan ultimately is
repaid and, thus, they do not bear the risk of loss if the borrower
defaults. 67
Another lender practice that is unfair, abusive, and
discouraged by public secondary purchasers, though likely legal, is
the steering of borrowers whose income qualified them for lowerinterest (or even prime) loans into higher-cost subprime loans. 68
Steering especially appears to be directed toward elderly and
minority borrowers. 6 9 For example, while the number of subprime
purchase loans to black borrowers increased by 686% from 19952001, the number of prime conventional purchase loans actually
fell by almost 6%. 70 Subprime loans constitute more than half
(51%) of all refinance loans in black communities, but just 9% of

brokers a bonus if they steer borrowers into higher interest loans. Though
industry reports suggest that this premium can benefit customers who are
unable to (or choose not to) pay the "upfront compensation" brokers require for
any particular loan, there is no evidence that borrowers who pay a yield
spread premium (and, necessarily, pay higher interest) are offered loans that
have more favorable overall terms than the loans offered to borrowers whose
brokers did not receive a yield spread premium. Compare CFAL Statement,
supra note 25, at 17 (advocating benefits to consumer of the yield spread
premium) with ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002, supra note 53, at 41
(explaining that yield spread premiums harm borrowers, while the borrowers
think that are securing the best possible loan).
67. Loans that exceed the value of the borrower's home leave the borrower
"upside down", i.e., the borrower owes more than the home is worth. These
loans harm borrowers if the lender forecloses on the home or the borrower
deeds the home to the lender to avoid a formal foreclosure proceeding because
the borrower would still owe the lender money.
68. Fannie Mae has stated that lenders who deliver loans to Fannie Mae for
purchase must ensure that "consumers who seek financing through a ...
higher priced subprime lending channel should be offered (or directed toward)
the ... standard mortgage product line if they are able to qualify for one of the
standard products." Fannie Mae, FAQ: Predatory Lending Practices, supra
note 59.
69. See generally Bunce et a!., supra note 25, at 260; ACORN, SEPARATE
AND UNEQUAL 2002, supra note 53, at 2; Michael Hudson, Banking on Misery,
S. EXPOSURE, Summer 2003, at 37 (reporting a claim by the former manager of
a subprime lender that admitted to packing the loans of borrowers who
appeared uneducated or inarticulate, was a minority, or was particularly
young or old). Elderly homeowners, especially, are vulnerable to subprime
home improvement scams since they are less likely to be able to make home
repairs themselves but are more likely to need home renovations to
accommodate their physical impairments. TREASURY/HUD REPORT, supra
note 22, at 39, 72; LOUIE ET AL., supra note 6, at 12-13.
70. ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002, supra note 53, at 24
(describing the growth of sub prime purchase loans)

2004]

Bankruptcy and Mortgage Lending: The Homeowner Dilemma

35

refinance loans in white neighborhoods. 71 In addition, minorities
constitute a larger overall percentage of the borrowers of subprime
refinance and purchase loans than their representation among
borrowers of prime refinance and purchase loans. 72
For example, in 2000, black borrowers received 13% of all
subprime refinance loans (compared to their 5% share of prime
refinance loans) and received 13% of all subprime purchase loans
(compared to their 4% share of prime purchase loans).73 In
contrast, white borrowers in 2000 received 70% of prime refinance
loans, but only 44% of all subprime refinance loans, and received
73% of all prime purchase loans, but only 51% of subprime
purchase loans. 74 In addition, homeowners in high-income black
neighborhoods are twice as likely as homeowners in low-income
white neighborhoods to have subprime loans.75 Indeed, both
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac concluded that potentially 35-50% of
minority borrowers of subprime loans could have qualified for a
lower-cost or conventional mortgage loan product. 76 In response,
71. ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2004, supra note 31.
72. Staten Statement, supra note 23, at 2; Bunce et al., supra note 25, at
258. See also ACORN, PREDATORY LENDING REPORTS 1 (2001) (reporting that
in 2000, 49.9% of all refinance loans received by black homeowners and 26.2%
of refinance loans received by Hispanic homeowners were from subprime
lenders whereas only 18% of the refinance loans received by white
homeowners were from subprime lenders), at http://www.acorn.org/
acornlO/predatorylending/plreports/summary.htm. It is difficult to discern the
precise racial disparity in subprime refinance lending because lenders often
failed to report the borrower's race and this failure may mask the actual
concentration of subprime lending in minority communities. See ACORN,
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002, supra note 53, at 22. The Federal Reserve now
requires lenders to inquire about the race of all telephone applicants. See
Press Release, Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve Release 20 (June 21, 2002),
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press!bcreg/2002/20020621.
73. ACORN, PREDATORY LENDING REPORTS; supra note 72, at 2. A recent
report indicates that 28% of all purchase money loans blacks received and
19.6% of purchase loans Hispanics received were from subprime lenders in
2002 while whites received only 7.8% of subprime purchase money loans.
Likewise, blacks are 4.1 times more likely to receive a subprime refinance loan
and Hispanics 2.5 times more likely to receive a subprime loan than whites.
ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2004, supra note 31, at 19, 35.
74. ACORN, PREDATORY LENDING REPORTS, supra note 72, at 2.
75. Unequal Burden, supra note 27, at 2 (reporting that while 6% of
homeowners in upper-income white neighborhoods have subprime loans and
18% of homeowners in lower-income white neighborhoods have subprime
loans, 39% of homeowners in upper-income black neighborhoods have
subprime loans and 51% of all home loans in black neighborhoods were
subprime loans (compared to 9% of all loans in white neighborhoods));
ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2004, supra note 31, at 25 (reporting that
19.6% of upper-income black homeowners, 13.4% of Hispanic homeowners, but
only 11.2% of lower-income whites receive subprime loans).
76. James H. Carr & Lopa Kolluri, Predatory Lending: An Overview, in
FINANCIAL SERVICES IN DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 31,
36-39 (2001) [hereinafter DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES]; FREDDIE MAC,
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subprime lenders stress that even higher-income subprime
borrowers likely would not qualify for prime loans because of their
credit history and debt-to-income ratios, and maintain that they
ensure that qualified borrowers are offered all available lending
products. 77
Finally, in addition to being steered to the subprime market,
minorities-regardless of their credit profiles-appear to rely
disproportionately on subprime lending because prime lenders
have significantly reduced the number of banking locations in
minority neighborhoods. The absence of traditional lenders in
minority neighborhoods may lead minorities to conclude that they
would not qualify for a prime mortgage product. Moreover, the
remaining vestiges of discriminatory lending practices may
prevent minorities from receiving prime loans, thereby forcing
them into the higher cost subprime market. 78

B. Regulatory Responses to the Abuse
1.

State and Federal Legislation
Most federal and state legislation that regulates predatory
lending practices essentially is a form of price control laws. The
oldest federal legislation, the Homeownership and Equity
Protection Act of 1994 ("HOEPA"), applies to home equity (not
purchase money) loans and mandates additional restrictions and
disclosures for home equity or refinance loans that have interest

AUTOMATED UNDERWRITING: MAKING MORTGAGE LENDING SIMPLER AND
FAIRER FOR AMERICA'S FAMILIES 2 (1996).
77. ACORN, Predatory Lending Practices, supra note 50.
Consumer
advocates dispute the claim that minority, low-income, and elderly borrowers
appropriately are steered to the subprime market by citing research that
indicates that loans to lower-income customers perform at levels similar to
loans to upper-income customers (especially when prepayment risk is taken
into account). See Robert Van Order & Peter Zorn, Performance of LowIncome and Minority Mortgages, in LOW-INCOME HOMEOWNERSHIP:
EXAMINING THE UNEXAMINED GOAL 324 (Nicolas Retsinas & Eric Belsky eds.,
2002).
78. See Bunce et al., supra note 25, at 258; James H. Carr & Jenny Schuetz,
Financial Services in Distressed Communities: Framing the Issues, Finding
Solutions, in FINANCIAL SERVICES IN DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES: ISSUES AND
ANSWERS 5, 7 (2001) (arguing that racial and economic disparities in subprime
lending cannot be justified by borrower creditworthiness alone); ACORN,
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002, supra note 53, at 34 (discussing racially
discriminatory lending practices and lender abandonment of low-income and
minority neighborhoods); Ross D. Petty et al., Regulating Target Marketing
and Other Race-Based Advertising Practices, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 335, 354
(2003) (suggesting that the banking industry's failure to advertise or
otherwise market to minorities may depress minority homeownership rates).
See generally JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS,
PAWNSHOPS, AND THE POOR 81-84 (1994).
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rates or fees that exceed a certain statutorily defined threshold. 79
HOEPA imposes limitations on prepayment penalties, default
interest rates, balloon payments, loan flipping, asset-based
lending, and negative amortizations. 80 Many lenders appear to
avoid making loans covered by HOEPA because of both the stigma
associated with making high-cost loans and the decreased value of
those loans in the secondary market.Bl
In response to reported cases of subprime lending abuses
(notwithstanding HOEPA safeguards), North Carolina became the
first state to adopt consumer protection legislation that regulates
"high-cost" loans.s2
The law prevents high-cost loans from
including balloon payments, higher post-default interest rates,
negative amortization, certain prepayment and third-party fees,
and prevents them from financing single-premium credit
insurance or offering to a borrower whose debt-to-income ratio
exceeds 50%.83 This law also curtails lenders' ability to flip loans
and mandates that borrowers who take out high-cost loans receive
homeownership counseling. 84 Other states have also enacted antipredatory lending legislation that either prohibits or severely
regulates some (or all) loan terms viewed as predatory, including
the financing of single-premium credit insurance (or debt
cancellation, or debt suspension agreements), balloon payments,
negative amortization, default interest rates, prepayment
penalties, and asset-based lending.85
79. HOEPA applies to first mortgage refinance loans if the annual
percentage rate ("APR") is more than 8% of the rate for Treasury securities
with a comparable maturity date. The APR interest rate trigger for second
mortgages or home equity loans is 10%. If the points or fees the borrower pays
exceed the greater of 8% of the loan amount or a flat fee (which is adjusted
annually based on the Consumer Price Index), HOEPA also applies. Reg. Z,
12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i) (2004).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c)-(i) (2000); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.32.
81. See Bryce Statement, supra note 34, at 10 (noting that members of the
Mortgage Brokers Association avoid making HOEPA-covered loans because
they are viewed as predatory and because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac refuse
to purchase HOEPA-covered loans).
82. High cost loans generally are defined as those that charge either
interest that exceeds Treasury bill rates by specified percentages or loans
whose points and fees exceed a certain percentage of the loan amount
(excluding certain legitimate fees, such as appraisal or title insurance).
CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, STATE INITIATIVES TO BATTLE
PREDATORY LENDING 10 (2002), available at http://www.csbs.org/
government/regulatory/pred_lending/pl_initiatives.pdf.
83. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 24-l.lE (1999).
84. QUERCIA ET AL., supra note 29, at 7, 25.
85. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 4970-4979.8 (West 2002); District of
Columbia Home Loan Protection Act of 2002, D.C. CODE ANN.§§ 26-1151.0126-1155.01 (2002); Colorado Equity Protection Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-3.5101-5.3.5-303 (2002); MAss REGS. CODE tit. 209 § 32.32 (2002); High Cost
Loan Regulation, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 3, §§ 41.1-41.11 (2001);
New Jersey Homeownership Security Act of 2002, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:10b-
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After the North Carolina legislation was enacted, the number
of subprime refinance loans made in that state decreased, causing
some to argue that the law reduced the supply of credit available
for lower and middle-income home buyers and has increased the
cost of the available credit.s6 In contrast, consumer advocates
maintain that the decrease can be attributed to a decline in ''bad"
refinance loans, i.e., those that contain balloon payments or
prepayment penalties exceeding three years, and loans with loanto-value ratios exceeding 110%. In addition, consumer advocates
note that while there was a decrease in subprime loans to
customers whose credit scores suggest that they could qualify for
prime loans and an overall decrease in refinance loans, there was
an overall increase in prime loans to those customers and an
increase in purchase money loan originations. 87 In essence,
consumer advocates argue, the decrease in subprime refinance
loans proves that the law was achieving its intended effect of
preventing lenders from engaging in predatory lending practices. 88

2.

Critiques of Legislation

a.

Preemption

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), the
federal agency principally responsible for regulating and
supervising federally chartered banks, 89 recently considered
whether banks with federal charters can be regulated by state
predatory lending laws. The OCC ruled that federal law preempts
state consumer protection laws because of its view that those laws
encroach on the federal government's authority to regulate the
lending terms of federally chartered (or insured) banking

22-46:10B-35 (West 2004); Illinois High Risk Home Loan Act, 815 ILL COMP.
STAT. 137/1-137/900 (2004); FLA. STAT. ch. 494.0079(g) (2001); New Mexico
Home Loan Protection Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-21A-14 (Michie 2004);
Georgia Fair Lending Act, GA. CODE ANN.§§ 7-6a-1-7-6a-13 (2003).
86. See GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & MICHAEL E. STATEN, REGULATION OF
SUBPRIME MORTGAGE PRODUCTS: AN ANALYSIS OF NORTH CAROLINA'S
PREDATORY LENDING LAW 1 (2002); GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & MICHAEL E.
STATEN, AN UPDATE ON NORTH CAROLINA'S HIGH-COST MORTGAGE LAW
(2003) (hereinafter ELLIEHAUSEN & STATEN, UPDATE ON NORTH CAROLINA].
87. QUERCIA ET AL., supra note 29, at 12-18.
88. Subprime Lending: Defining the Market and Its Customers: Joint

Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit and the
Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, Before the House Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 108th Cong. 8 (2004) [hereinafter Butts Statement] (prepared
statement of George Butts, ACORN Housing Corporation); QUERCIA ET AL.,

supra note 29, at 19-21.
89. Other federal agencies with oversight are the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve System and the Office of Thrift
Supervision.

2004]

Bankruptcy and Mortgage Lending: The Homeowner Dilemma

39

institutions. 90 The OCC also maintains that state laws are
unnecessary because existing OCC anti-predatory lending laws
adequately protect consumers.91 Not surprisingly, the subprime
lending industry supports the OCC ruling, contending that the
overly restrictive patchwork of state laws creates confusion and
leads to a balkanized environment which generally disrupts the
national mortgage system and erodes investor confidence in (and
thus the value of) securitized or pooled subprime loans in the
secondary mortgage market.92 Moreover, lenders maintain that
this balkanization of credit will increase the cost of, and decrease
the availability of, credit for borrowers with less than prime credit
profiles, thus harming the people who should be helped by the
legislation. 93 Moreover, lenders contend that the state and local
laws are "stealth usury laws" designed to ban certain loans by
increasing the costs of certain loan procedures and also increasing
lender (and sometimes purchaser or assignee) liability for making
those loans. 94
Critics of the OCC ruling argue that it is ill-conceived because
it effectively prevents states from using their laws to protect their
citizens from predatory lending practices and because, in any
event, only Congress (not a regulatory agency) should preempt
state laws and regulations.95 Critics also dispute lenders' claims
90. See Oversight of Office of the Comptroller of the Currency: Hearing
Before the House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 18--19 (2004) [hereinafter
Hawke, Jr. Statement] (prepared statement of John D. Hawke, Jr, Comptroller
of the Currency) (discussing the preemption rule and longstanding precedent
to operate under uniform federal standards).
91. See id. at 20-21; OCC Takes on Abusive Loans in Texas In First Case to
Allege "Unfair" Lending, 72 U.S. L. WK. 18 (2003) (suggesting that OCC's
settlement with subprime lender for unfair (but not deceptive) practice
indicates OCC's ability to protect consumers).
92. See Subprime Lending: Defining the Market and Its Customers: Joint
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit and the
Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, Before the House Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 108th Cong. 5 (2004) [hereinafter Calomiris Statement] (prepared
statement of Charles W. Calomiris); Bryce Statement, supra note 34, at 3.
93. CFAL Statement, supra note 25, at 26. See also ELLIEHAUSEN &
STATEN, UPDATE ON NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 86.
94. Calomiris Statement, supra note 92, at 5; Bryce Statement, supra note
34, at 13.
95. The Office of Thrift Supervision also ruled that federal savings
associations are exempt from state anti-predatory lending laws. Mark
Fogarty, Fed Charters Supercede State's in Predatory Lending, N.M. B. WKLY,
Sept. 12, 2003, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/albuquerque/
stories/2003/09/15/story5.html. See generally Hearing on Oversight of Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 108th Cong. 1 (2004) (prepared statement of the Honorable Peter T.
King) (questioning OCC authority to preempt state laws); Hearing on
Oversight of Office of the Comptroller of the Currency: Hearing Before the
House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 1 (2004) (prepared statement of the
Honorable Rahm Emanuel) (same).
·
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that complying with state consumer protection laws will
necessarily increase the cost of credit. Because most subprime
mortgages are originated by state-licensed mortgage companies,
costs should not significantly increase since state entities should
be expected to know their own state laws and generally would not
need to understand the laws of other states. 96 Moreover, because
states can more quickly respond to abusive real estate lending
practices involving their citizens, critics maintain that in the long
run federal preemption will harm consumers.97
b.

Controversy over Scope of "Predatory''

Critics also contend that state predatory lending laws are
vague and overbroad, citing the sharp disagreement over which
loan features or lender practices should be deemed abusive or
"predatory." Both consumer advocates and lenders agree that
illegal or fraudulent practices (including forging documents or
misrepresenting the features included in a loan) constitute
predatory lending practices. Moreover, most now appear to agree
that single-premium credit insurance, high-interest default
interest rates, asset-based lending, and loan flipping generally are
abusive.98
However, lenders refute suggestions that balloon
0
payments and prepayment penalties are per se abusive because of
their view that these loan terms can help borrowers who want low
initial payments (which balloons provide) or lower interest rates
(which prepayment penalties give to borrowers who do not repay
their loans early). 99 Likewise, lending industry spokespersons
96. See, e.g., CFAL Statement, supra note 25, at 4 (characterizing the
subprime market as primarily local); Subprime Lending: Defining the Market
and Its Customers: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and
Consumer Credit and the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, Before
the House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 9 (2004) (prepared statement of
William M. Dana, American Bankers Association) (recognizing that "real
estate lending is in many ways a local issue").
97. See Protecting Homeowners: Preventing Abusive Mortgage Lending
While Preserving Access to Credit: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin.
Insts. and Consumer Credit and the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty.
Opportunity, Before the House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 7, 14-15
(2003) [hereinafter Brown Statement] (prepared statement of George Brown)
(detailing superiority of state regulators to protect consumers against
predatory lending).
98. CFAL Statement, supra note 25, at 22; SMITH, supra note 49, at 1. Of
course, some lenders may now agree that asset-backed lending is improper
because of a Federal Trade Commission ruling that concluded that making a
loan to a borrower who cannot afford the monthly payments constitutes an
unfair and deceptive act and practice. Predatory Lending Practices in the
Home-Equity Lending Market: Hearing Before the Cal. State Assembly Comm.
on Banking and Fin., [NEED CA SESSION NUMBER] (2001) (prepared
statement of the FTC), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/02/
predlendstate.htm;
99. Zeltzer Statement, supra note 55, at 4.
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vehemently deny that minorities, the poor, or the elderly are
inappropriately steered to subprime products, citing their own
data that suggest that sub-prime borrowers are demographically
similar to the general population and to prime borrowers.l 00
Moreover, even if minorities, the poor, and the elderly
disproportionately receive subprime loans, lenders argue that they
appropriately pay more for credit because they are more likely to
have lower income and credit scores and relatively higher
delinquency and foreclosure rates.l0 1

C. Non-Regulatory Tools to Combat the Abuse
1.

Consumer Counseling and Education
The subprime lending industry contends that the best way to
combat abusive predatory lending practices is through the use of
consumer financial education and counseling programs.10 2 Indeed,
credit counseling and financial literacy programs increasingly are
touted as the most effective way to help consumers avoid unwise
spending decisions.l 03 Consumer advocates are more skeptical of
the benefits of mandated consumer education for adults 104 and
100. See CFAL Statement, supra note 25, at 8-9 (suggesting that subprime
borrowers are racially diverse, and are approximately the same age as and
have comparable annual incomes to the general population); Zeltzer
Statement, supra note 55, at 3-4 (disputing a stereotype that subprime
borrowers are minority, elderly and very poor); Samuels Statement, supra note
34, at 9 (suggesting that prime and nonprime customers have substantially
similar demographic features).
101. ABDIGHANI HIRAD & PETER M. ZORN, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF
HARVARD UNIV., A LITTLE KNOWLEDGE IS A GOOD THING: EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRE-PURCHASE HOMEOWNERSHIP
COUNSELING 13 (Low-Income Homeownership Working Paper Series No. 01.4,
2001); Staten Statement, supra note 23, at 14---15. Elderly homeowners appear
to be targeted by predatory lenders because they tend to have relatively high
home equity, but low income, and often have medical or home repair needs
and often need funds to support a family member. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 23,
at 15-17; LOUIE ET AL., supra note 6, at 37.
102. CFAL Statement, supra note 25, at 11; Samuels Statement, supra note
34, at 14 (noting support by Housing Policy Council, which funds more than
60% of prime and subprime mortgages, for stronger financial literacy
programs and greater availability of credit counseling); Bryce Statement, supra
note 34, at 14---15 (noting support of Mortgage Bankers Association, the
national association that represents the real estate finance industry, of
consumer education); Zeltzer Statement, supra note 55, at 7 (stating support
by trade association for home equity lenders for consumer education).
103. For example, the bankruptcy reform legislation that has stalled in
Congress for almost a decade would force debtors to receive limited counseling
as a prerequisite to filing for bankruptcy and then would condition the right to
a discharge on the consumers completion of a personal financial management
course. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2003, H.R. 975, 108th Cong. § 106 (2003).
104. Though consumer advocates may be leery of mandated consumer
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maintain that counseling and education (without regulating
predatory lending practices) inadequately responds to predatory
lending just as crime prevention and safety education (without
prosecuting the criminal) is an inadequate response to a crime
wave,105
There is limited empirical evidence about the effectiveness of
debtor education or financial literacy and education programs. 106
The programs that appear to be the most effective in helping
consumers avoid unwise financial decisions are individualized prepurchase counseling courses that are taught in a classroom or a
one-on-one setting with the borrower.1°7 Unfortunately, most
credit counseling programs rely heavily on telephone or home
study counseling or steer clients to internet sites for financial
information_1°S Given this, it is unclear how well these programs
education for adults, consumer advocates, industry spokespersons, bankruptcy
judges, and government officials universally support mandated personal
finance courses to K-12 students. See, e.g., Marc Perrusquia, Bankruptcy
Didn't Solve Couple's Financial Problems.
They Seek Help to Trim
Uncontrolled Spending, THE COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Dec. 9, 2003, at
AS (reporting support for K-12 financial literacy program by the Federal
Reserve Chairman, a nonprofit debt counseling organization, and a bank
foundation); Bankruptcy Judges Launch Debtor Education Program,
CONSUMER BANKR. NEWS, Mar. 19, 2004 (discussing the Credit Abuse
Resistance Education Program for middle, high school and college students);
John C. Ninfo, II, Credit Education for Young People Works, 23-5 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 32 (June 2004) (discussing Credit Abuse Resistance Education
Program that provides education to middle, high school and college students
and is sponsored by bankruptcy judges and the local bar association).
105. Butts Statement, supra note 88, at 9.
106. HIRAD & ZORN, supra note 101, at 13. Cf. MARK WIRANOWSKI, JOINT
CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., SUSTAINING HOMEOWNERSHIP
THROUGH EDUCATION AND COUNSELING 5 (2003) (noting that "evidence of the
potential benefits of postpurchase education and counseling is almost entirely
anecdotal; very little empirical evidence corroborates their effectiveness").
107. Financial Literacy Education: What Do Students Need to Know to Plan
For the Future: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Educ. Reform, House Comm.
on Educ. and the Workforce, 108th Cong. 4 (2003) (statement of Dr. Angela
Lyons, Assistant Professor and Extension Specialist, Department of
Agriculture and Consumer Economics) (suggesting financial education reduces
the likelihood of being financially at-risk but that effective programs and
services must be tailored to the client's needs). Credit counseling agencies
may provide less face-to-face counseling because of concerns that borrowers
would prefer the anonymity of online education or because borrowers may
have difficulties leaving work to attend classes during regular business hours.
See Profiteering in a Non-Profit Industry: Abusive Practices in Credit
Counseling: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the
Comm. on Sen. Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 2 (2004) [hereinafter
Dancel Statement] (prepared statement of Bernaldo Dancel, Chief Executive,
Amerix Corporation).
108. CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. & NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR, CREDIT
COUNSELING IN CRISIS: THE IMPACT ON CONSUMERS OF FUNDING CUTS,
HIGHER FEES AND AGGRESSIVE NEW MARKET ENTRANTS 8, 19 (2003)
[hereinafter CREDIT COUNSELING IN CRISIS); Profiteering in a Non-Profit
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would educate consumers about the risks of predatory lending
practices since education reqmres more than just providing
information. 109
Advocates for greater regulation of the subprime lending
market can now point to recent controversies involving the credit
counseling industry to support their view that legislators should
use caution before mandating credit counseling instead of
regulating lenders.
Consumers, their advocates, and some
governmental entities have charged existing counseling agencies
with engaging in deceptive practices, giving improper advice, and
charging exorbitant fees notwithstanding their tax-exempt
status.l 10 Indeed, some counselors appear to give no budgeting,
saving, or planning advice and, instead, encourage consumers to
participate into debt management plans ("DMPs") that require

Industry: Abusive Practices in Credit Counseling: Hearing Before the
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Sen. Governmental
Affairs, 108th Cong. 6 (2004) (statement of Cuba Craig, CEO, American
Financial Solutions-a nonprofit consumer credit counseling agency)
(reporting that counseling and educational services largely consist of
interactive online class, telephone sessions, and newsletters). Until 1993,
most counseling was supplied in a classroom or by individual in-person
meetings. Once Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac required counseling for some of
its borrowers, the demand for counseling increased, which may have caused
more agencies to start providing home study and telephone counseling. See,
e.g., HIRAD & ZORN, supra note 101, at 5.
109. See generally Hilgert & Hogarth, supra note 26, at 321 (suggesting that
education requires a "combination of information, skill-building, and
motivation to make the desired changes in behavior").
llO. CREDIT COUNSELING IN CRISIS, supra note 108, at 8-9; MAJORITY &
MINORITY STAFF OF THE PERMANENT SENATE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS,
108TH CONG., PROFITEERING IN A NON-PROFIT INDUSTRY: ABUSIVE PRACTICES
IN CREDIT COUNSELING 11, 12 (2004) [hereinafter ABUSIVE PRACTICES IN
CREDIT COUNSELING]. Because credit card companies and many state laws
require credit counseling programs to have non-profit status, most credit
counseling agencies are tax-exempt organizations who are now finding it
increasingly difficult to fund credit counseling. CREDIT COUNSELING IN
CRISIS, supra note 108, at 26-27. The IRS has performed audits of several
large consumer counseling agencies in response to allegations of abuse. See

Profiteering in a Non-Profit Industry: Abusive Practices in Credit Counseling:
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 1 (2004) (statement of the Honorable Mark
W. Everson); ABUSIVE PRACTICES IN CREDIT COUNSELING, supra, at 31-32
(discussing audits). One of these agencies (AmeriDebt) recently filed for
bankruptcy partly because of litigation involving its counseling practices. See

also Profiteering in a Non-Profit Industry: Abusive Practices in Credit
Counseling: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the
Comm. on Sen. Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 4 (2004) [hereinafter Puccio
Statement] (prepared statement of John Puccio, President and CEO of
Cambridge Credit Counseling Corporation) (deflecting criticisms of tax-exempt
not-for-profit status of credit counseling agencies by noting that they are
forced to have that organizational structure); Caroline E. Mayer, AmeriDebt
Bankruptcy Threatens Settlement, WASH. POST, June 8, 2004, at E02.
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them to repay virtually all their unsecured credit card debts.l 11
There is a fairly high failure rate in DMPs, which is not surprising
since employees of some credit counseling agencies often fail to
determine whether the consumer has the means to repay the
debts, rarely recommend that the consumer would benefit by filing
for bankruptcy, and often spend as little as ten minutes
"counseling" clients before placing them in a DMP.l 12
Even a well designed consumer education or counseling
program may fail if consumers possess certain cognitive biases.
Behavioral studies indicate that people tend to underestimate lowprobability but high-loss events because the "availability" heuristic
111. ABUSIVE PRACTICES IN CREDIT COUNSELING, supra note 110, at 2-3.
Much of the recent controversy surrounding debt counseling agencies involve
DMPs. Some agencies now charge consumers monthly service fees (though
some deceptively suggest that those fees are "voluntary charitable
contributions") and often charge consumers a one-time initial fee (in an
amount equal to one month's regular debt payment) to "customize" the DMP.
CREDIT COUNSELING IN CRISIS, supra note 108, at 17, 27; Puccio Statement,
supra note 110, at 12-13; Jennifer Bayot, U.S. Suit Accuses Credit Counselor of
Deception, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2003, at C17 (discussing a lawsuit filed by the
FTC against a large nonprofit credit counselor that alleged the agency charged
customers 3% of outstanding debts upon enrollment plus a $20 monthly fee).
Critics note that many DMPs include only the debts of creditors who return a
percentage of the funds they receive from the counseling agency back to the
agency (an arrangement known as Fair Share). See CREDIT COUNSELING IN
CRISIS, supra note 108, at 9-11. This often leaves consumers faced with
making one payment to the credit counseling agency then multiple payments
to secured creditors and to unsecured creditors whose debts are not included
in the DMP. See id. at 24-25.
112. See Profiteering in a Non-profit Industry: Abusive Practices in Credit
Counseling: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the
Sen. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 1 (2004) (statement of Jon
Pohlman) (former employee of a major credit counseling agency reported that
the agency pressured consumers into DMPs and discouraged counselors from
scrutinizing consumer's total financial profile); Profiteering in a Non-Profit
Industry: Abusive Practices in Credit Counseling: Hearing Before the
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Sen. Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 108th Cong. 1 (2004) (statement of John Paul Allen) (former employer
of counseling agency reporting reprimands for spending too much time
counseling clients and disclosing too much information to clients). Credit
counseling programs suggest that they have been forced to abandon in-depth
consumer education programs in favor of DMPs because the credit card
industry has substantially decreased its Fair Share Contributions and many
essentially refuse to fund credit counseling services other than DMPs.
Profiteering in a Non-profit Industry: Abusive Practices in Credit Counseling:
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Sen. Comm.
on Governmental. Affairs, 108th Cong. 12, 14 (2004) [hereinafter Malesardi
Statement] (prepared statement of Michael Malesardi). This also likely
explains why credit counseling agencies resist advising consumers to file for
bankruptcy.
CREDIT COUNSELING IN CRISIS, supra note 108, at 25.
Notwithstanding the high failure rates associated with DMPs, credit
counseling agencies contend that DMPs themselves can educate consumers by
giving them a framework both to exercise financial discipline and to learn how
to devise and follow a budget. See Dancel Statement, supra note 107, at 4.
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causes people to view an event (like losing your home to a
foreclosure) as improbable unless the person has recently seen it
or heard about it. 11 3 Likewise, once people form certain beliefs or
make decisions based on those beliefs, they become overly
committed to those beliefs and are inattentive to, or simply ignore,
new information (assuming it is provided) that contradicts their
beliefs. 114 If "anchoring" causes their present decisions and choices
to be constrained by prior decisions, they will attempt to justify
prior decisions even if others suggest that those decisions are not
sound.l 15
A cognitively-impaired consumer who has formed a certain
belief (e.g. I am a hard worker who deserves the American Dream),
will be inattentive to any new information (low or no down
payments or cash-out refinance loans may cause high debt-toincome ratios that increase the risk of default and foreclosure) that
contradicts her beliefs whether she learns about this information
from friends or family, the media, or in a consumer literacy course.
Moreover, unless the information is presented to her at a
"teachable moment," she may be unwilling to pursue consumer
education or unwilling to change her behavior based on what is
being taught in the course.ns
Even if a current or potential homeowner participates in a
consumer education course, she may be over-committed to certain
decisions and search for ways to justify those decisions
(homeownership provides valuable tax benefits; cash-out refinance
loans can help reduce unsecured credit card debt) rather than
113. See Goldstein & Strohauer, supra note 60, at 7 (suggesting borrowers
agree to prepayment penalties because of the highly asymmetric position of
borrowers versus lenders in understanding the statistical likelihood that they
will pay the penalty). See also Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the
American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government's
Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L. REV. 373, 383-84 (1994)
(arguing that homeowners likely discount the risk of losing home to a
foreclosure).
114. Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE
11, 26 (1998). See generally Forrester, supra note 113, at 384-85 (noting how
certain heuristics skew the homeowner decisionmaking process); DONALD C.
LANGEVOORT, THE HUMAN NATURE OF CORPORATE BOARDS: LAW, NORMS, AND
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
811 (Georgetown Univ., Working Paper No. 241402, 2000); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decision making in Corporate Governance, 55
VAND. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (2002).
115. See Rabin, supra note 114, at 26 (noting that "'fresh' thinkers may be
better at seeing solutions to problems than people who have meditated at
length on the problems, because the fresh thinkers are not overwhelmed by
the 'interference' of old hypotheses").
116. See Hilgert & Hogarth, supra note 26, at 320 (discussing the challenge
of teaching consumers about financial management topics using an effective
method (like one-on-one counseling) at a time when the consumer is most
likely to "recogniz[e] the value of the information and [make] a behavioral
change").
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accept information that suggests that she needs to change her
financial behavior. Likewise, even if confronted with information
concerning financially risky behaviors, consumers may interpret
that information by incorporating the things that serve their
personal interests or pre-conceived beliefs, but ignoring
information that contradicts those interests or beliefs. Similarly,
the "sunk cost trap" may hamper the effectiveness of consumer
education programs by causing people to cling to their past
decisions and then incrementally make overly optimistic but good
faith decisions (like refinancing mortgages with prepayment
penalties multiple times, or taking out a cash-out loan to repay
credit card debt) which harms them once an unexpected event
occurs (like unemployment, illness, or divorce).

2.

Additional disclosures
The typical legislative response to abusive business practices
is to require additional disclosures.l 17 Consumers who are given
these additional disclosures theoretically will be better able to
make informed choices about the products or services being
offered. Mandating additional disclosures to combat predatory
lending practices is problematic for a number of reasons. First,
even assuming homeowners read the disclosures, they are likely to
discount any additional disclosures given the amount of paper they
already receive during a mortgage loan closing. Since even a
relatively sophisticated consumer likely does not comprehend
these existing disclosures, the average consumer likely will not
would benefit from additional disclosures even if the information is
clearly (and comprehensively) presented.l 18 Moreover, given the
number of Americans who are functionally illiterate, additional
disclosures - even if clearly written - would not protect them from
a potentially abusive loan,119
117. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7262; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.13 (2003) (requiring
credit card issuers to disclose the length of time it would take the borrower to
repay the balance if only the minimum monthly payments are made).
118. The Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") requires lenders to disclose the cost
of credit (i.e., finance charges and the APR) to potential borrowers and the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (''RESPA") requires lenders to give
potential borrowers a standard statement of settlement costs. See, e.g., Truth
in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601; Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12
U.S.C. § 2601. Cf. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1179 (1983) (stating general agreement
among scholars that an "adhering party is in practice unlikely to have read
the standard terms before signing the document and is unlikely to have
understood them if he has read them").
119. OFFICE OF EDUC. RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
PUB. NO. 1993-275, ADULT LITERACY IN AMERICA 16 (2002) (reporting that the
percentage of functionally illiterate adults in America is near 21 %); IRWIN S.
KIRSCH ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, ADULT LITERACY IN
AMERICA 17 (1993) (finding 21-23% of adults are functionally literate). See
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In addition, given the cognitive biases previously discussed,
even borrowers who comprehend the disclosures may
underestimate the likelihood that they will either default on their
loan payments or be forced to pay prepayment penalties.
Likewise, because lenders are not required to disclose credit and
pricing information until closing, few homeowners will delay a
closing to try to compare price information (assuming, of course,
the potential borrower had the ability to obtain useful pricing
information from other subprime lenders).12o Finally, because
research suggests that the most effective form of consumer
education is an individualized, in-class format, even if disclosures
are clear and understandable, the average borrower will not
understand (or change their behavior based on) the information
provided in the disclosure or the risks associated with the
disclosed term or transaction.

3.

Voluntary Compliance or "Best Practices"

Many subprime lenders appear willing to adhere to voluntary
industry codes or ''best practices" and they contend that
compliance with these guidelines would eliminate much of the
perceived or actual abuses in the subprime market. 121 Developing,
and offering to comply with, best practices or standards is often
proposed by industries or groups who face potentially more
stringent regulations.l 22
Thus, some subprime lenders have
agreed: not to "purchase or offer loans with balloon payments,
Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L.
& POL'y REV. 233, 262 (2002) (discussing futility of disclosures for illiterate
consumers). Making the disclosures clear and meaningful likely would be
cost-prohibitive and still may be too complex for the average consumer. See,
e.g., Jean Braucher, Defining Unfairness: Empathy and Economic Analysis at
the Federal Trade Commission, 68 B.U. L. REV. 349, 359-361 (discussing
whether even meaningful disclosures would alter consumer behavior).
120. See Mansfield, supra note 19, at 544-45 (discussing information
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers and general unavailability of
pricing information in the subprime market). See generally Lynn Drysdale &
Kathleen E. Keest, The Two· Tiered Consumer Financial Services Marketplace:
The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the
Role of Usury Laws in Today's Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 626 (2000)
(discussing inequality of bargaining power and information asymmetry
between consumers and the fringe banking industry, including title pawn
shops and finance companies).
121. Zeltzer Statement, supra note 55, at 5 (stating support by the trade
association for home equity lenders for the voluntary Code of Ethics and Fair
Lending and Best Practices Guidelines).
122. For example, credit counseling agencies now appear willing to comply
with voluntary standards to avoid increased federal regulation of that
industry. See Dancel Statement, supra note 107, at 4; Malesardi Statement,
supra note 112, at 8-9. Members of this industry urge Congress to preempt
state regulatory efforts, arguing that those regulations create a "confusing,
inconsistent state patchwork of laws and creditor mandates." Malesardi
Statement, supra note 112, at 15.
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negative amortization, mandatory arbitration clauses," or single
premium credit insurance; not to approve loan applications until
they "verify the borrower's ability to repay the loan;" and "not to
solicit their loan portfolios within [a year of] the origination of the
loan" (which, theoretically, should prevent loan flipping)J23
Voluntary codes, practices, or other forms of self-regulation
are limited precisely because they are voluntary and do not
require lenders to comply with the voluntary rules.l 24 A member
of the industry who determines that it is more profitable to engage
in rogue behavior and ignore or violate the guidelines will do so
even if most members of the industry comply with the rules. Since
the rules are voluntary, there is no way to force the rogue member
to agree to be bound by the voluntary rules. Moreover, even if a
lender agrees to be bound by the guidelines, it is unclear who
would have the authority to ensure compliance or how lenders who
deviate from the guidelines after having agreed to comply with
them would be punished.l25

D. Damage to Homeowners Caused by the Abuse
Existing federal and state laws have not adequately protected
consumers from either predatory lending practices or legitimate
subprime lending that place their homes at risk. Homeowners
with weaker credit histories, large household indebtedness, or
adjustable rate mortgages are likely to be the most affected by a
downturn in the economy or rising interest rates.I2 6 Homeowners'
higher mortgage debt burdens (whether or not the result of
predatory practices) have triggered an increase in the number of
lower and middle-income borrowers who are defaulting on
123. CFAL Statement, supra note 25, at 22. Of course, the subprime lenders'
willingness to "voluntarily" remove mandatory arbitration clauses may have
been prompted by Freddie Mac's and Fannie Mae's decision not to purchase
prime or subprime mortgage loans that include mandatory arbitration clauses.
Freddie Mac Will Not Buy Subprime Loans that Contain Mandatory
Arbitrarion Clauses, 72 U.S. L. WK. 2342 (2003); Fannie Mae Will Not Buy
Home Mortgages with Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 72 U.S. L. WK. 2463
(2004).
124. Indeed, even a recently formed coalition of credit counseling agencies
concedes that self-regulation without federal regulations will be ineffective.
See MICHAEL BARNHART, COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE CREDIT PRACTICES,
BUILDING FULL FAITH IN CREDIT COUNSELING: AN AGENDA FOR INDUSTRY
REFORM 8 (2004).
125. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 5, at 1338 (proposing legislation that
requires mandatory participation by subprime mortgage lenders and brokers
in self-regulatory organizations that would have the authority to discipline
members who violate the rules of existing law). Cf ABUSIVE PRACTICES IN
CREDIT COUNSELING, supra note llO, at 23--24 (discussing limitations of selfregulation of consumer credit counseling industry).
126. The Condition of the Banking Industry: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm.
on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 6 (2004) (statement of
Donald E. Powell, Chairman, FDIC).
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mortgage loans and losing their homes either through foreclosures
or informal proceedings.l2 7
Not surprisingly, the rate of
foreclosures (especially by subprime lenders) increased when
subprime lending increased.l 28 While some private and public
lenders now refuse to offer (or buy) loans that contain terms that
are associated with predatory lending,l29 consumer advocates
continue to demand increased regulation of home equity lending.
Current legislative efforts focus on protecting homeowners from
high cost-loans and eliminating predatory features of subprime
lending.
Even if lenders stopped making loans with predatory features
or if existing efforts that allow homeowners to refinance out of a
predatory loan are successful, many low income, elderly, and
minority homeowners will be harmed if they continue to use cashout refinance or home equity loans to convert dischargeable
unsecured card debt into non-dischargeable secured mortgage
debt.l 30
Recent research indicates that financially stressed
homeowners with high loan-to-value ratios tend to have less
127. See Bahchieva, Wachter & Warren, supra note 5, at 13 (stressing that
homeowners who have defaulted on their mortgage loans increasingly lose
their homes both through formal foreclosure proceedings and because they
deed their homes to lenders in lieu of foreclosure).
128. See Bunce et al., supra note 25, at 263; Mansfield, supra note 19, at
554-56 (discussing studies that suggest increase in the foreclosure rate for
subprime home equity loans). While some suggest that the high foreclosure
rate for subprime loans is to be expected given the weaker credit histories of
the borrowers, consumer advocates suggest that lenders create the high
default rates by making loans borrowers cannot afford. See also Hevesi, supra
note 32, at 1 (discussing increase in subprime mortgage industry predatory
lending, and foreclosures). Compare STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2003,
supra note 2, at 18-19 (suggesting that record level foreclosures are due to an
increased share of loans extended to borrowers with weak credit histories),
with Mansfield, supra note 19, at 541, 553 (arguing that lenders' extended
loans to borrowers who could never afford to repay the loans).
129. For example, Fannie Mae has indicated that it will not purchase loans
that finance prepaid single-premium credit life insurance premiums. Fannie
Mae, FAQ: Predatory Lending Practices, supra note 59. Many subprime
lenders no longer require or offer this type of insurance, most likely because
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac refuse to purchase loans on the secondary
market if the loans finance this insurance and because several state consumer
lending laws substantially restrict the use of this type of insurance. Similarly,
Fannie Mae has indicated that it will not accept loans from lenders where the
points and fees charged exceed 5% absent extraordinary circumstances (for
example, if the larger fee was warranted because of the small size of the loan).
Fannie Mae, FAQ: Predatory Lending Practices, supra note 59.
130. See Press Release, Mortgage Lender and Community Partners Join
Fannie Mae to Introduce New Anti-Predatory Lending Refinance Initiatives to
Help Borrowers (Oct. 15, 2001) (discussing a pilot initiative that would permit
certain borrowers to refinance out of a high-cost loan into a fixed-rate loan);
Fannie Mae Announces Seven-Year, $55 Billion 'HouseChicago' Investment
Plan to Finance Affordable Housing for 500,000 Chicago Families, Bus. WIRE,
May 15, 2001 (discussing the same pilot initiative).
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unsecured consumer debt, which suggests that they are
substituting mortgage debt for consumer debt.l 31 Given the high
loan default rates for low-income and minority households, even if
the non-purchase money loans are not fraudulent or abusive,
many lower and middle-income homeowners who take out home
equity or refinance loans increase the risk that they will place
their homes at risk in order pay for non-housing goods and
services,132
Because purchase money mortgage loans help
borrowers increase their wealth while non-purchase money
refinance or home equity loans often do not, the rest of this Article
considers whether bankruptcy laws should continue to provide the
same favorable treatment to both types of mortgage debt.

IV. BANKRUPTCY TREATMENT OF CONSUMER DEBT
A. Mortgage Debt
Mortgage debt receives favored treatment in bankruptcy
cases. Even though the debtor's personal obligation to repay this
debt can be discharged, the mortgage holder's lien on the debtor's
home survives the bankruptcy. Thus, even if the loan is a nonrecourse loan or the debtor receives a discharge and is not
personally obligated to repay the mortgage, the creditor can
foreclose on the debtor's home after the debtor receives a
discharge.
Giving purchase money mortgage loans favored
treatment easily can be justified.l33
As an initial matter, protecting mortgage lenders from lien
avoidance in bankruptcy is consistent with state and federal laws
that encourage (and often subsidize) homeownership. 134
Protecting mortgage lenders should decrease lender risk,
encourage them to keep lending to potential home owners, and,
ostensibly give them a greater incentive to keep interest rates low.
When the 1978 Bankruptcy Code was enacted, most mortgages
were purchase money loans that had relatively low fixed interest
131. Bahchieva et al., Wachter & Warren, supra note 5, at 17-18.
132. David Flaum, High Default Rates Found on Memphis Home Loans;
Number About Twice that of Nation's 6.4% Average, THE COM. APPEAL
(Memphis, Tenn.), May 21, 2002, at B7 (suggesting that high default rates in
one city for Federal Housing Administration-backed purchase money loans
were due to lenders giving out bad loans, loans that are too large for the
borrower to repay, and abusive loans).
133. See Zimmer v. PSB Lending Corp. (In re Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220 (9th
Cir. 2002); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992).
134. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(h)(1), (h)(2) (date) (allowing a deduction for
mortgage interest); I.R.C. § 164(a)(1) (date) (allowing deduction for real estate
taxes); I.R.C. §§ 1034(a), 121(a)-(b) (date) (limiting the recognition of gains
from home appreciation). The government also has promoted homeownership
in the past by encouraging public housing units to be converted to private
ownership. See Forrester, supra note 113, at 394, 394 n.105 (discussing laws).
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rates and were heavily regulated by state usury laws. 135 Today,
interest rates that can be charged in the mortgage market are
essentially unregulated, lenders increasingly make adjustable
rate, or negatively amortized loans, and federal law preempts
state usury regulations of interest ceilings on mortgage loans
secured by a first lien on the home for federally regulated loans.l36
Though prime purchase money loan interest rates still tend to be
relatively low, the interest rates of some subprime loans can be
almost double prime rates,137
The Code justifiably encourages purchase money lending by
giving mortgage lenders protections that other consumer credit
lenders (who typically charge much higher interest rates) do not
receive. 138 The Code specifically favors mortgage lenders by
preventing Chapter 7 debtors from reducing a mortgage holder's
claim by bifurcating it into a secured (equal to the value of the
home) and an unsecured claim then avoiding or "stripping'' the
unsecured (i.e., underwater) portion,l 39 In addition, a Chapter 13
debtor cannot strip down the lien to the value of the home if the
mortgage is partially secured. Some courts also prevent Chapter
13 debtors from discharging or modifying underwater mortgage
liens.l 40 Recently, however, an increasing number of courts have
started to treat first mortgages more favorably than wholly
unsecured junior mortgages. Specifically, a majority of federal
courts now permit a Chapter 13 debtor to modify or partially avoid
a wholly unsecured non-purchase money mortgage lien even
though the Code generally prevents debtors from modifying liens
on the debtor's principal residence.l 41
135. See generally Engel & McCoy, supra note 5, at 1275 (discussing
expansion of mortgage products as a result of federal deregulation of the home
mortgage industry).
136. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980, 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a (preempting state usury caps on first lien
martgages); Id. § 1735f-7a(l). Lew Sichelman, Mortgage Discrimination Is
Alive and Well, REALTY TIMES, Oct. 4, 1999, available at
http://www.realtytimes.com/rtcpages/19991004_discrimination.htm.
137. ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2004, supra note 31, at 5.
138. See generally Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1993)
(Stevens, J., concurring). By making student loan debt presumptively nondischargeable in both Chapter 7 and 13, the Code gives similar protections to
student loan creditors who also tend to lend at below market interest rates. 8
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1322-05 (Henry J. Somer & Alan N. Resnick eds.,
15th ed. Rev. 2004).
139. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 412 (holding that a debtor cannot strip down
a creditor's lien to the value of the collateral); In re Pearson, 214 B.R. 156, 158
(Bankr. D. Ohio 1997).
140. See Nobleman, 508 U.S. at 332 (refusing to permit a debtor from
stripping down an under-secured lien to the fair market value of the home).
141. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2004) (preventing debtors from
impairing rights of mortgage lenders in Chapter 13 cases). See also Wade v.
Bradford, 39 F.3d 1126, 1130 (lOth Cir. 1994) (prohibiting a Chapter 13 debtor
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B. Other Consumer Debt
Consumer debt levels are staggering. Consumer debt has
more than doubled in the last decade and total household debt was
almost $9 trillion in 2003.
Consumers had $6.8 trillion in
mortgage debt in 2003 and non-housing debt exceeded $2 trillion
for the first time in 2004.1 42 In 1990, the average household nonmortgage debt was approximately $8,500 but increased to $14,500
in 2000,1 43 Total household debt is at a record high of 112% of
disposable personal income.l 44
Credit card debt also has skyrocketed and exceeded $750
billion at the end of 2002.145 People with incomes below the
poverty level doubled their credit card debt since the early 1990s
and the poor now use credit cards more frequently than the
wealthiest Americans.l46 Typical non-promotional credit card
interest rates in 2004 range from 5.5% to 19.99%,147 Because
credit card lending is unsecured, lenders argue that they must
charge relatively high interest rates for these loans to protect
themselves against the risk of non-payment.l 48 However, unlike
non-purchase money home equity or refinance lenders, credit card
issuers are not favored creditors in bankruptcy, even though
borrowers often take out refinance or home equity loans to repay
from modifying mortgage lender's rights); Zimmer v. PAB Lending Corp. (In re
Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 2002) (permitting stripping of
underwater lien); Lane v. West. Interstate Banccorp (In re Lane), 280 F.3d
663, 664 (6th Cir. 2002); Pond v. Farm Specialist Realty (In re Pond), 252 F.3d
122, 124-25 (2d Cir. 2001); Tanner v. FirstPlus Fin., Inc. (In re Tanner), 217
F.3d 1357, 1358 (11th Cir. 2000); Bartee v. Tara Colony Homeowners Ass'n (In
re Bartee), 212 F. 3d 277, 280 (5th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In
re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 607-08 (3d Cir. 2000).
142. Barbara Hagenbaugh, Consumer Debt Loads at Record, USA TODAY,
Mar. 18, 2004, at lB (citing Federal Reserve data); Economy and Jobs Watch:
Consumer Debt Increases, Savings Rate Down, at http://www.ombwatch.org/
article/articleview/1938 (Dec. 2, 2003); Markets; U.S. Import Prices Rise;
Consumer Debt Slows, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2004, Business at C4.
143. Non-Profit Credit Counseling Organizations: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 108th Cong.
27 (2003) (statement of Michael Barnhart, Coalition for Responsible Credit
Practices).
144. The Condition of the Banking Industry: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm.
of Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 4 (2004) (statement of
Donald E. Powell, Chairman, FDIC).
145. Eileen Alt Powell, Consumer Debt More than Doubles in Decade, AP,
Jan. 5, 2004. Standard & Poor's puts the figure much lower, at $412 billion.
See Hagenbaugh, supra note 142; CardTrak, Economic MO.A.B., Mar. 2003,
at http://www.cardweb.com/cardtrak/pastissues/mar03.html.
146. CREDIT COUNSELING IN CRISIS, supra note 108, at 4.
147. Cardweb, Find a Card, at http://www.cardweb.com/perllcardlocator/
surveyllowrate?o=O (last visited June 10, 2004).
148. Libby Wells, High-Risk Borrowers Face Sky-High Rates, but Cards Can
Be Used to Create Good Credit, at http://www.bankrate.com/brrnlnews/cc/
19991220.asp (last updated Aug. 14, 2002).
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credit card debt.
Fortunately for debtors (since almost all consumer
bankruptcy cases involve credit card debt),I 49 credit card debt is
presumptively dischargeable. Credit card issuers can rebut the
presumption of dischargeability only if they prove that the debtor
fraudulently incurred the debt_I50 Because of the amount of credit
card debt that is discharged in bankruptcy, non-dischargeability
complaints based on credit card debt are common and
contentiously litigated disputes in consumer bankruptcy cases.l 51
Though bankruptcy reform legislation that would make it harder
to discharge credit card debt has been before Congress for almost a
decade, the legislation has not passed and, thus, unsecured credit
card debt remains presumptively dischargeable.1 52
149. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 119-20 (2000); WARREN & TYAGI,
supra note 23, at 77-78.
150. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2). See, e.g., AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Mercer
(In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391, 425 (5th Cir. 2001); Am. Express Travel Related
Servs. Co. v. Hashemi (In re Hashemi), 104 F. 3d 1122, 1126 (5th Cir. 1997).
151. See, e.g., Am. Express Travel Related Serv., Inc. v. Dorsey (In re
Dorsey), 120 B.R. 592, 595 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990). Some courts have held
that debtors who cannot afford to repay credit card charges at the time they
incur the debt defraud credit card issuers when they nonetheless use the
credit card for purchases. In re Cullen, 63 B.R. 33, 35 (Bankr. D. Mo. 1986);
J.C. Penney Co. v. Shanahan (In re Shanahan), 151 B.R. 44, 47 (Bankr. W.D.
N.Y. 1993); Colonial Nat'l Bank USA v. Leventhal (In re Leventhal), 194 B.R.
26, 27 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1996); First N. Am. Nat'l Bank v. Widner (In re
Widner), 285 B.R. 913, 921 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2002); Am. Express Travel
Related Servs. v. Prieto (In re Prieto), 258 B.R. 518, 525 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
2001). Increasingly, however, courts have ruled that credit card issuers
cannot prevent debtors from discharging credit card debt that they could not
afford to repay based on the court's finding that the credit card issuers failed
to properly screen debtors to determine their creditworthiness before they
issued the cards, then failed to properly monitor the debtor's credit card use
after they issued the card. See, e.g., AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Mercer
(In re Mercer), 211 F.3d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that "the credit card
issuers' irresponsible lending practices . . . leads to more consumer
bankruptcies"); AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Feld (In re Feld), 203
B.R. 360, 372 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (allowing discharge of credit card debt on
grounds that the creditor did not sufficiently investigate the debtor's income
prior to extending credit).
152. Once it became clear that most bankruptcy courts would discharge
credit card debt even if the debtor was over-indebted when she used the credit
card, the credit card industry lobbied Congress to revise the Code and make it
harder to discharge debts. See Lou Dobbs, In Hock to the Hilt, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., July 21, 2003, at 36; Philip Shenon, Hard Lobbying on Debtor
Bill Pays Dividend, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2001, at A1 ("Sponsors of the bill
acknowledge that lawyers and lobbyists for the banks and credit card
companies were involved in drafting it."); Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele,
Soaked By Congress, TIME, May 15, 2000, at 64, (arguing that Congress
aggressively pursued bankruptcy reform because of campaign contributions
members received from various banks, credit card companies, debt
consolidators, and other financial services businesses and because of the
urging from the credit industry's politically influential lobbyists); Robert
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In addition to giving unsecured consumer credit card lenders
fewer protections in bankruptcy, the Code also gives non-purchase
money, non-mortgage lenders fewer protections than mortgage
lenders. Specifically, while purchase money and home equity
mortgage liens survive bankruptcy, the Code allows debtors to
avoid some non-purchase money secured liens on certain types of
property_153
Congress allows debtors to strip certain nonpossessory, non-purchase money liens on household goods because
they concluded that the liens were often coerced, were not needed
to protect the
lender's interest (often because the
collateral/property had little more than sentimental value and
virtually no resale value), and because the debtor's cost to replace
the goods were higher than the amount the creditor would receive
if the creditor repossessed the goods (which rarely happened).1 54
V.

PROPOSAL

Borrowers often use refinance/home equity loans to pay off
other consumer debts or to purchase non-housing consumer goods
or services. Given this, the lenders who provide these loans act no
differently than other consumer lenders and the interest rates and
fees associated with subprime loans (especially those with
predatory features) are not substantially different from the rates
associated with credit card lending_15 5 Since credit card issuers
and other non-purchase money consumer creditors have no favored
treatment in bankruptcy, there is no theoretical justification for
providing such treatment for mortgage lenders who effectively
function as general consumer or credit card lenders. Therefore,
while liens traditionally pass through bankruptcy, liens that arise
because of a pre-petitionl56 refinance or home equity loan
presumptively should be voided in bankruptcy and the mortgage
debt should be treated as a general, unsecured claim.1 57 The loans
Heady, Consumers Take 1-2 Punch: House And Senate Legislation Would
Make It Much Harder for Debtors to Declare Bankruptcy, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 16,
1998, at C7.
153. 11 u.s.c. § 522.
154. H.R. REP. No. 95-595 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-989 (1978). Both reports
appear reprinted in 11 U.S.C.S. § 522.
155. Holden Lewis, Fed Tightens Rules on Sub prime Lending, Dec. 20, 2001,
at http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mtg/20011220a.asp ?.
156. Loans that a debtor enters into post-petition would not be affected by
this proposal. Thus, the growing practice of using cash-out refinance loans to
fund a Chapter 13 plan could continue, though the lender's lien would be
affected by this proposal if the debtor files for bankruptcy again. In re
Sounakhene, 249 B.R. 801, 804 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2000); In re Evora, 242 B.R.
560, 560-62 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999).
157. There may be limited instances in which a loan that was designed to
lower a borrower's overall debt failed to do so or the loan did not worsen the
borrower's position in bankruptcy. In those instances, the creditor should be
allowed to prove that the lien should not be stripped because the loan was
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affected by this proposal would include non-purchase money loans
that convert dischargeable non-housing consumer debt into nondischargeable mortgage debt by, for example, repaying consumer
debts or purchasing non-housing goods or services or loans that
replace a lower interest rate mortgage loan.158

A. Benefits
Consumers benefit in bankruptcy by having credit card or
other unsecured non-purchase money debt rather than mortgage
debt because, absent fraud, they can discharge the unsecured debt
and the unsecured creditor has no bankruptcy or state law right to
take the debtor's home after the bankruptcy. Distinguishing
between purchase money and refinance/home equity debt in
bankruptcy, instead of making a distinction between prime,
subprime, and predatory lending, is consistent with the
bankruptcy Code's more favorable treatment of purchase money
debts. Moreover, treating purchase money debt more favorably
than non-purchase money debt further reinforces the public policy
that supports home acquisitions. Likewise, focusing on whether
designed to lower the borrower's payments or that it made the borrower no
worse off than the borrower would have been absent the loan. For example, if
a borrower uses refinance loan proceeds to pay for college expenses, the
creditor should be allowed to prevent the debtor from stripping the lien if the
lender can prove that but for the home equity loan, the debtor would have
incurred non-dischargeable student loan debt. Cf. Engel & McCoy, supra note
5, at 1343-44 (proposing a suitability test that evaluated whether terms in the
subprime loan provided a "discernable benefit" to the borrower or were
economically justified). When liens are avoided in bankruptcy, the value of
the avoided transfer is preserved for the benefit of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 551.
To ensure that the debtor (and not his unsecured creditors, including the non·
purchase money mortgage lender) reaps the benefit of avoiding the lien, the
Code would also need to be amended to give debtors a right to exempt the
value represented by any non·purchase money mortgage lien that is avoided.
158. Because lenders have "flipped" interest-free mortgages on Habitat for
Humanity homes and convinced borrowers to exchange those interest-free
mortgages for high interest ones, debtor homeowners should be allowed to
discharge the refinanced debt and strip the lien of any lender who flips low·
interest prime (or Habitat) loans into high·interest loans.
See Brown
Statement, supra note 97, at 7; Perrusquia, supra note 104 (discussing Habitat
homeowners who almost lost their home to a predatory lender). See generally
Engel & McCoy, supra note 5, at 1264, 1264 n.19 (discussing lenders who
convince borrowers to refinance lower-interest rate loans with higher-rate
loans). Loans that refinance higher-interest loans and result in an overall
reduction of the loan debt would not be affected by this proposal. Moreover, if
the lender and borrower intend for the refinance loan to lower overall debt (by,
for example, going from a fixed rate to an adjustable rate during a period
when interest rates are falling), but changes in market conditions cause the
debt to increase (because, for example, interest rates increase dramatically
after the loan is executed), the lender should be allowed to raise as an
affirmative defense in a lien avoidance action that the loan was intended to
benefit the borrower.
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the loan is purchase money (rather than whether it is high-cost or
predatory) also avoids the debate over the definition of predatory.
Making a distinction between the purposes for the loan also should
help prevent lenders from circumventing the law by creatively
renaming their lending practices, as some lenders did to avoid
HOEPA regulations.l59
Unlike the price controls contained in most federal and state
subprime lending laws, giving non-purchase money loans less
favorable treatment in bankruptcy does not ban or otherwise
regulate the substantive terms of the loan. Instead, it places the
full risk of non-payment on lenders. The practice of asset-based
lending indicates that some lenders consciously ignore the
borrower's inability to repay the loan. Moreover, the high (and
early) default and foreclosure rates associated with subprime
lending, and the disproportionately higher amounts of refinance
loan debt relative to purchase money loan debt held by debtors in
bankruptcy, suggest that many borrowers cannot afford the
refinance loans at origination. 160
Creating a rebuttable
presumption that these loans are dischargeable will give lenders
more of an incentive to carefully screen borrowers into "can pays."
Giving lenders an incentive to better screen borrowers by making
non-purchase money mortgage debt presumptively nondischargeable also would bolster recent trends in the secondary
market. That is, Fannie Mae has admonished lenders who want it
to purchase loans to "determineD the borrower's ability and
willingness to repay the mortgage debt." 161 This policy suggests
that Fannie Mae, at a minimum, specifically disapproves of assetbased lending and generally disapproves of any lending that is
designed to force the borrower to default and, ultimately lose the
home in a formal insolvency proceeding (or deed the home to the
lender).1 62 Fannie Mae's action also suggests it understands that
159. To avoid HOEPA regulations, some lenders kept rates under the
HOEPA caps but increased the loan by changing fees that are not required to
be included when calculating whether the loan is covered by HOEPA. See
ACORN, Predatory Lending Practices, supra note 50. Likewise, after states
started to regulate single-premium credit insurance and major secondary
market purchasers refused to purchase loans that financed this insurance,
lenders replaced credit insurance with "debt cancellation agreements," which
essentially were credit insurance agreements but technically were not
regulated by state predatory lending laws. See, e.g., Brown Statement, supra
note 97, at 15.
160. See Puccio Statement, supra note 110, at 1 (suggesting that
democratization of credit has caused consumers to have excessive access to
overly expensive credit). But see Hevesi, supra note 32 (discussing data that
suggest that the rate of foreclosure in the subprime market rose while
foreclosures in the prime market fell); Bahchieva, Wachter & Warren, supra
note 5 (pointing to data that there is more refinance debt than prime debt in
bankruptcy).
161. Fannie Mae, FAQ: Predatory Lending Practices, supra note 59.
162. This policy also somewhat confirms consumer advocates' beliefs that
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consumers' cognitive biases may prevent them from admitting that
they simply cannot borrow their way out of the financial problems.

B. Likely Criticisms
Some homeowners who seek to refinance their purchase
money or refinance loans may be affected by the proposal.
However, loan transactions that are designed to reduce the
borrower's overall mortgage debt (by, for example, refinancing a
higher interest loan to a lower interest one) would not be affected
by this proposal, lenders could prevent their claim from being
treated as unsecured, and their liens would not be avoided.
Nonetheless, some will argue that this proposal, like state and
local consumer protection laws, will decrease the availability of
credit for the people the laws are designed to protect.1 63 Lenders
likely will argue that the risk of having their liens avoided will
cause them either to increase the costs of refinance loans or to stop
making these loans altogether. Lenders also might argue that
making non-purchase money debt unsecured and dischargeable
will disproportionately harm Hispanics and blacks because they
receive a greater percentage of subprime loans than prime loans
and receive proportionately more subprime loans than nonminorities.
Certainly, minority homeownership increased significantly in
the 1990s, at the same time subprime home equity lending was
increasing. However, most subprime loans are refinance (not
purchase money) loans and, given the dramatic increase in
subprime foreclosures in low-income minority communities, it is
unclear whether a "democratization" or "balkanization" of credit is
best for those consumers.1 64 Moreover, even if this proposal affects
some lenders pressure consumers into accepting certain loan terms (like
prepayment penalties or credit insurance) or products even if they are not in
their best interest and even if the loans only leave the borrower with more
debt. For example, one homeowner reportedly refinanced a purchase money
loan, and received a subprime refinance loan for $17,398 at a 17.99% interest
rate. Most of the refinance loan consisted of the debt rolled over from the
purchase money loan and the new loan included $304 in fees. The homeowner
received $93.45 in new money. Hudson, supra note 49, at 1. Another
homeowner paid $1,164 for five different types of insurance on a $5,001 loan
and another paid $7,242 in insurance premiums on a $34,075 loan. Id. at 33,
35.
163. For example, while one commentator argued in favor of allowing home
equity loans to be modified in Chapters 11 and 13 and suggested that
homeowners should be able to strip down home equity debt to the value of the
home (something most courts currently allow, see Forrester, supra note 113, at
452), the article raises concerns that additional revisions to bankruptcy law
(including allowing debtor to avoid non-purchase money liens against the
exempt portion of a homestead) should be rejected because of the impact those
changes would have on credit availability. See Forrester, supra note 113, at
454.
164. STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2003, supra note 2, at 15, 19.
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the supply of high-cost purchase money loans, it is unclear
whether lower or middle-income home buyers generally are able to
keep the homes they purchase. Indeed, for some lower-income
households, it may be better for them economically to use the
income they would otherwise spend on the unaffordable mortgage
to instead rent a home, save for their retirement or their children's
college expenses, or save money to help their children buy a home
in the future_165
The proposal may, however, hurt homeowners who seek to
refinance a purchase money loan for a home that they could never
afford. Though regrettable, existing financial conditions suggest
that the American Dream of owning the home of your dreams may
already be beyond the reach of many lower and middle-income
consumers. Unfortunately, some consumers seem unwilling to
believe that they cannot afford the home they desire even if the
"dream" home seems too good to be true, even if they are told
about the dangers associated with high-cost loans, or even if
paying their housing expenses prevents them from saving for their
own retirement or their children's college education.166 This leads
them to spend more than 30% (sometimes as much as 50%) of their
household income on housing, which puts them at risk of either
losing their homes or falling prey to predatory lending practices if
they have an income interruption or need to make repairs to their
homes.16 7
Societal changes, including increased risks of
unemployment and divorce, essentially require that potential
homeowners view shelter (whether owned or rented) as the Dream
instead of assuming that the American Dream consists of a
"starter" house, then a larger "dream" house later in life. Though
165. See THOMAS P. BOEHM & ALAN M. SCHLOTTMANN, HARVARD UNIV.
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, HOUSING AND WEALTH ACCUMULATION:
lNTEGENERATIONAL IMPACTS 3-4 (Oct. 2001) (discussing the role of parental
homeownership on the timing of transition for young households to
homeownership); Dickerson, supra note 14 (citing sources that indicate
parental wealth plays a crucial role in determining whether and when people
attend college or purchase a home). Cf Engel & McCoy, supra note 5, at 135960 (accepting criticism that increased regulation of predatory lending may
cause credit constraints and endorsing the outcome because of the authors'
view that some loans simply "should not be made in the first place").
166. Michael Moss & Andrew Jacobs, Blue Skies and Green Yards, All Lost
to Red Ink, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2004, § 1, at 1 (discussing plight of
homeowners who purchased unaffordable homes in the Poconos). See also
Paul Gores, Blacks Here Most Likely to Get Riskier Home Loans, MILWAUKEE
J. SENTINEL, May 8, 2003, at 1D (reporting a consumer counseling supervisor's
concern that people regularly ignore risks associated with high-interest loans
because of their determination to do anything to quickly buy a house). See
·also SMITH, supra note 49, at 2 (discussing a borrower's vulnerabilities during
transaction with a predatory lender, including "low income and/or low wealth,
financial [naivete] . . . or. . . gullibility," and lack of competition among
subprime lenders)
167. WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 23, at 83.
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this suggestion may strike some as paternalistic, changes in the
labor market now may dictate that the starter 11home" be a rented
apartment and the final dream home be a modest house that the
owner purchases after renting for a longer period of time.
Even if this proposal restricts the amount of credit available
to potential homeowners and appears to be somewhat
paternalistic, it will have net positive effects if it prevents
homeowners from becoming over-indebted and acts, in effect, as
social insurance to protect them from income shocks caused by
unemployment, divorce, or medical (or other unanticipated)
expenses,168 Moreover, these restrictions may help eliminate the
externalities created when homeowners lose their homes and
should help stem the damage caused by the dramatic rise in
consumer debt and foreclosures,1 69 Stated differently, rather than
viewing the decreased availability of home equity or refinance
loans as a harm to homeowners, using the bankruptcy Code to
regulate non-purchase money mortgages may prevent homeowners
from placing their homes at risk to pay for the furniture in the
home or the car in the driveway.
VI. CONCLUSION

Many refinance and home equity loans, especially subprime
ones, are systematically stripping homeowners of equity wealth.
These loans do not enable homeowners to purchase their homes,
and in fact, cause many to lose their homes. To discourage
homeowners from converting unsecured debt into secured
mortgage debt and to encourage lenders to provide loans that the
borrower can afford to repay, non-purchase money mortgage debt
should be treated by bankruptcy laws as presumptively
dischargeable unsecured consumer debt. Even if this proposal
deprives some owners of the ability to use the proceeds from a
high-cost loan to make repairs to their homes or to pay off highinterest credit card debt, it at least will prevent more owners from
losing the homes themselves.

168. Id.
169. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 5, at 1347 (listing external costs of
unaffordable mortgage loans, including ''homelessness, dependence on the
state, and neighborhood decline due to abandoned properties").

